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Abstract
Cryptography methods have been around for a long time to protect sensitive data. With
data sets becoming increasingly large we wish to not only store sensitive data in public
clouds but in fact, analyse and compute there too. The idea behind homomorphic en-
cryption is that encryption preserves the structure and allows us to perform the same
operations on ciphertext as we would on the plaintext. A lot of the work so far restricts
the operations that can be performed correctly on ciphertexts. The goal of this thesis is
to explore methods for encryption which should greatly increase the amount of analysis
and computation that can be performed on ciphertexts.
First of all, we will consider the implications of quantum computers on cryptography.
There has already been research conducted into quantum-resistant encryption methods.
The particular method we will be interested in is still classical. We are assuming these
schemes are going to be used in a post-quantum world anyway, we look at how we can use
the quantum properties to improve the cryptosystem. More specifically, we aim to remove
a restriction that naturally comes with the scheme restricting how many operations we
can perform on ciphertexts.
Secondly, we propose a key exchange protocol that works in a polynomial ideal setting.
We do this so that the key can be used for a homomorphic cryptography protocol. The
advantage of using key exchange over a public key system is that a large proportion of the
process needs to be carried out only once instead of needing a more complicated encryp-
tion function to use for each piece of data. Polynomial rings are an appropriate choice of
structure for this particular type of scheme as they allow us to do everything we need. We
will examine how we can perform computation correctly on ciphertexts and address some
of the potential weaknesses of such a process.
Finally after establishing a fully homomorphic encryption system we will take a more
in-depth look at complexity. Measuring the complexity of mathematical problems is, of
course, crucial in cryptography, but the choice of measure is something we need to consider
seriously. In the final chapter we will look at generic complexity as its gives us a good feel
for how difficult the typical instances of a problem are to solve.
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Despite the cloud providing the incredible potential for the future of computation – ex-
tremely fast processing power and seemingly unlimited storage to name just a couple –
the move toward cloud computing faces challenges that must be addressed before it is
fully adopted. The problem that concerns a lot of potential users is that others may also
have access to the information that is sent to the cloud [Kulkarni et al. (2012)]. This is
especially concerning for those dealing with sensitive data. If security concerns are partic-
ularly high, for example when it comes to medical or financial data, encryption methods
must be used to put minds at ease that the data won’t fall into the wrong hands.
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology)-recommended cryptographic algo-
rithms have been approved after receiving intense security analysis [Barker et al. (2012)].
More so, this is an ongoing process where each algorithm is constantly being examined.
Three classes of approved algorithms are used: Hash functions; symmetric-key algorithms;
asymmetric-key algorithms.
In 2017 NIST began the process of trying to select new cryptographic algorithms to aug-
ment already widely accepted schemes [Alagic et al. (2019)]. At the end of that year, the
first round of candidates were announced and the public was encouraged to comment on
them. In January the first round ended and second round began with 26 of the candidates
being invited to add any updates to the schemes. The 3rd round is set to begin 2020/2021.
One of the main aims of introducing these new schemes is to deal with the challenges of
modern and near future-security.
A new generation of security issues has begun with the rapid adoption of the internet
of things (IOT). There are more connected devices than people on the planet. We are
currently playing catch up trying to secure these devices. The problem is only getting
worse as the rate at which IOT is being adopted increases. It is said that there is only
a short window of time to deal with the problem before it gets almost irreversibly out of
control.
In more standard computer network settings, security is a well studied and implemented
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Security strength Through 2030 2031 and beyond
≤ 80 Applying Disallowed
processing Legacy-use
112 Applying Acceptable Disallowed
Processing Legacy use
128 Applying/Processing Acceptable Acceptable
192 Acceptable Acceptable
256 Acceptable Acceptable
Table 1.1: Security-strength time frames
topic. We need to use all that knowledge and experience to secure all of our new devices.
Just because most devices in the IOT landscape are weak and perform a limited number of
tasks, doesn’t mean that there can’t be large negative repercussions from malicious people
who can get access. One of the more famous examples of this is the Mirai botnet attack
in 2016 [Antonakakis et al. (2017)].
As tempting as it may be to use all the best settings to achieve maximum security, we have
standards on what is considered secure. Trying to use larger parameters will just cause a
strain on computation and bandwidth, something we want to avoid in general but a pre-
cious resource in particular for IOT. Table 1.1 gives an outline of the security strengths (in
bits) that will be acceptable to use over the next couple of decades. The number one goal
of cryptography has always been to ensure readable versions of sensitive or private data
do not get into the wrong hands, even if it is potentially accessible. It was suggested in the
70s however that it may be possible to do more than just safely store data; in fact, useful
operations could be performed on encrypted data [Rivest et al. (1978)]. This concept
is known as homomorphic cryptography. Figure 1.1 provides a visual summary of what
the ultimate goal of this area of research is. The vertical arrows represent cryptographic
methods as they have always been, a method to secure information that may be stored in
an insecure place. The horizontal arrows represent the methods of data analysis we cur-
rently use. The bottom arrow is the version we have been using longer, data analysis on
some local device. The top arrow represents the move to cloud where the same work can
potentially be carried out much faster. Should a practical solution for homomorphic cryp-
tography be found, the need for the lower arrow could be removed. In many IOT settings
this offline analysis is not even possible as the devices holding the data are too weak to
carry out the required functions. Since the idea was presented, homomorphic encryption
has been through a few evolutions [Acar et al. (2018)]. The first colleciton of homomorphic
encryption methods are known as partial homomorphic encryption. These protocols are
homomorphic with respect to a single operation. Examples of this are RSA (after Rivest,
Shamir and Adleman) where E(m1) ∗ E(m2) = E(m1 ∗ m2), Goldwasser-Micali where




Figure 1.1: Summary of data analysis
(2014)]. While an interesting step in the right direction, no meaningful computation can
be performed using these properties alone.
Somewhat homomorphic cryptosystems are a class of cryptosystems that have encryption
functions that are only approximately homomorphic. The problem here is that the errors
in the approximations accumulate so that only finitely many operations are possible with-
out the data becoming irretrievably corrupted. One of the advantages of these systems
is that some allow both addition and multiplication to be performed on ciphertexts. In
[Naehrig et al. (2011)] a somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem that takes advantage of
the Ring Learning with Errors problem is presented.
The next important advance was the development of fully homomorphic encryption sys-
tems. An encryption scheme is called fully homomorphic if we can perform as many
operations of our choice on ciphertexts as we need. In the last 10 years, a few of these
methods have been proposed [Acar et al. (2018)]. The first of these methods is Gentry’s
lattice-based scheme. To begin with, Gentry started with a somewhat homomorphic en-
cryption scheme and developed a method to deal with the noise that comes with such
schemes. This method came in two steps, first was known as squashing that reduces the
degree of the ciphertexts to a point that the second step can handle. The second step
is known as bootstrapping which safely re-encrypts the data, resetting the error to the
desired amount. Moving forward with the idea of a bootstrapping method, a new fully ho-
momorphic encryption method was suggested, but this time set in the integers [Van Dijk
et al. (2010)]. The beauty of this method is that simply being integers is much more
conceptually simple. The third method is based on the ring learning with errors prob-
lem. The setting for this scheme is in Rq ≡ Zq[x]/(f(x)), the ring of polynomials modulo
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some polynomial f with coefficients in Zq. This scheme, discussed in [Lyubashevsky et al.
(2010)], has drawn a lot of attention due to two major factors. First, the learning with
errors problem is thought to be very difficult to solve even in a post-quantum world. Sec-
ondly, ciphertexts are relatively small - a very important aspect of considering how quickly
ciphertexts can grow when multiplication is performed.
A new threat to the world of security is quantum computing; which is quickly being ac-
cepted as a reality, not only in most of our lives but potentially in the next decade [Easttom
(2017)]. In conventional computing, information is stored as a sequence of bits, each of
which is a 0 or 1. Quantum computing in a similar sense deals with information that is
stored as a sequence of qubits, each of which is 0, 1, or a quantum superposition of the
two. When it comes to physically observe a qubit, a measurement is performed, and if
in a superposition, the qubit will collapse down to either a 0 or 1. Although there is an
infinite number of combinations of superposition for a qubit, an important restriction of
quantum computing is that it is physically impossible to store a qubit in a superposition.
This means that there is no increase in efficient storage compared to classical computing.
One of the key areas where quantum computing does outperform classical is its speedup
of various algorithms. One of the earliest examples of this is the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm
[Deutsch & Jozsa (1992)]. The algorithm solves the problem of determining if a function
that outputs a single bit is constant or balanced (outputs a 0 for half its inputs and a 1
for the other half). In the classical version, a number, exponential in the size of the input,
total queries to the function are required to solve the problem. However, the quantum
Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm only requires a single query. This example of an exponential
speedup is the motivation for quantum attacks in cryptography.
While considered secure from all known conventional attacks, integer factorization, discrete
log, and elliptic curve methods each have been subject to efficient quantum attacks, for
example the well known Shor’s algorithm [Shor (1994)] for solving the discrete logarithm
problem. It is uncertain when access to a quantum computer will be available but, as al-
ready stated, many believe it to be in our lifetime. As such alternative “quantum-resistant”
methods need to be kept in mind and ready to go as soon as possible. Fortunately, while
old methods may become obsolete, this emerging area of computing has already proven to
bring with it new possibilities. Random numbers are required in many security methods.
Unfortunately in classical computing, we aren’t able to generate genuine random numbers.
We, therefore, have to rely on pseudorandom numbers which are generated from some al-
gorithm. On the other hand, a qubit can be set up in a superposition of 0 or 1 where, after
performing a measurement, there is an even chance of observing the 0 or the 1. Assuming
no one has tampered with this qubit, this measurement will be truly random. Security
initiatives in quantum computing therefore no longer need to worry about an attacker
having malicious access to the pseudorandom number generator. There is still cause for
concern with issues such that the qubits may still be tampered with, however, research
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has gone into testing for such malicious activity [Colbeck & Kent (2011)].
One of the most high profile cryptographic methods to emerge from quantum computing
so far is the BB84 protocol [Shor & Preskill (2000)]. The symmetric key algorithms men-
tioned earlier, require two or more parties to have knowledge of a shared key that should
be unknown to anyone else. Key exchange methods already exist in classical computing
that makes this possible, however, many of the more well-used versions rely on the discrete
log and other problems that we have already mentioned will become insecure in quantum
settings. Alternatively, the BB84 protocol performs the key exchange and bases its secu-
rity on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics. The reason the scheme works is
due to the fact that taking a measurement of a qubit requires a choice of basis in which to
measure in. This is the secret that the parties looking to exchange keys don’t tell anyone.
An eavesdropper can’t know what the choice of basis was used so an attempt to read the
key has a non zero probability of altering the key in a noticeable way.
In chapter 3 we will have a look at an example of an advantageous change that can be
made to an encryption scheme in a quantum setting. Lattice-based methods are based on
a different difficult problem and are one of the front-runner candidates for cryptosystems
in a quantum world. In particular, the NTRUEncrypt public key cryptosystem has accu-
mulated a lot of interest since its initial development towards the end of the 90’s [Pecen
et al. (2014)], in particular two NTRU schemes have made it to the second round of NIST
post-quantum competition earlier [Alagic et al. (2019)].
Another example of a lattice-based protocol is the GGH (Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi)
encryption scheme [Goldreich et al. (1997)]. This is an example of the somewhat homo-
morphic encryption methods where the number of operations (in this case addition) that
can be performed correctly is restricted by an error component. Although many schemes
have these error terms, this one, in particular, has an error that can be easily represented
by a random walk [Spitzer (2013)]. Because of this, after a given number of additions have
been performed on a ciphertext, we can create a distribution of the potential accumulative
error. Most importantly, there is a finite number of options each of which we know the
probability of.
There are many variations of the addition circuit on a quantum computer. We will con-
sider the circuit in [Takahashi et al. (2009)], which is very similar to that of the classical
version, in section 3.2.1 for adding together ciphertexts. The major difference is that
the quantum version will preserve superpositions. For example, suppose we have qubits
represent a superposition of values 2 and 4 and this is added to a superposition of values
8 and 11. The circuit will output a superposition of (2+8), (2+11), (4+8), and (4+11).
Updating the GGH system in such a way that a ciphertext is in a superposition of all
potential classical ciphertexts means that we know the exact form of a sum even without
performing a measurement. The rest of section 3.2 contains original content which works
towards the main aim of this chapter, to look at quantum methods to correct this error
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back to a standard amount for a fresh ciphertext.
The updates for the error correction in this chapter also bring with them new issues that
put the security of the protocol at risk. In section 3.3 we will look at methods to deal with
these issues. Fortunately, the problem isn’t a full break of the cryptosystem, nevertheless,
it is still, of course, important to be aware of different attacker goals [Stinson (2005)]. Two
approaches will be used for protection. The first comes from classical computing and is
based on work in [Watson (2012)], where we temporarily use private clouds at the start
to obscure information that would otherwise put individual data at risk when processing.
The second method is quantum and takes inspiration from the quantum key exchange
discussed earlier. We aim to use the fact that if an eavesdropper tries to look at particular
information, a fundamental change will occur to the qubits involved. This may not stop
the eavesdropper but will give us a tool to see if there has been malicious activity.
In section 3.4 we will take a look at how some basic statistical functions were implemented
in a ring learning with errors setting [Naehrig et al. (2011)] and study how plausible it
would be to do the same in this scheme.
In chapter 4 we aim to build a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Rings are an
appropriate choice of structure for this particular type of scheme due to the plus and mul-
tiplication operations available [Kahrobaei et al. (2019)]. They can be built up into more
meaningful functions that would enable data analysis. In particular we will be interested
in polynomial rings, much like in [Rai (2004)].
The work in [Kahrobaei et al. (2019)] uses rings to build a fully homomorphic encryption
scheme using rings and ideals. Much like a lot of the lattice-based methods, encryption
is performed by multiplying a plaintext by a secret key followed by adding a random
element. In this scheme in particular a message, m, is encrypted by multiplying by a
random private idempotent, r, of a private idea followed by adding a random element, i,
of that private ideal i.e. of the form mr + i. Any issue we discuss later is how to form a
correct homomorphism. This scheme achieves an additive homomorphism by firstly using
the distributive property of multiplying the plaintext by the same random idempotent
m1r +m2r = (m1 +m2)r. Secondly the only requirement for the random element added
during the encryption is that is an element of the private ideal, a property that will be
maintained by adding two ideal elements together. The multiplicative homomorphism is
achieved by taking advantage of those two points alongside the fact that r was an idem-
potent, namely m1r ·m2r = m1m2r2 = m1m2r.
Testing for ideal membership has been used as a difficult problem forming the basis of
cryptosystems proposed in rings [Albrecht et al. (2016)]. These protocols are at risk of
being broken due to the existence of Gröbner bases. While it is thought to be difficult to
establish whether a ring element belongs to an ideal, based on the basis elements of the
ideal, a Gröbner basis is constructed in such a way that the problem is easy. Therefore,
the security of these categories of schemes is reliant on not being able to find a Gröbner
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basis. In commutative polynomial rings, covered in section 4.1, it is known that any ideal
basis has a corresponding Gröbner basis and can be found using Buchberger’s algorithm
[Buchberger & Winkler (1998)]. Commutative schemes base their security on the fact that
some Gröbner bases take an infeasible length of time to find. We will, however, be looking
at a non-commutative scheme in section 4.2, the advantage being some bases for ideals
have provably no Gröbner basis. This will be done by looking at examples of where Mora’s
algorithm [Mora (1985)] does not terminate. These initial examples will come from [Rai
(2004)]. A lot of work in these Polly Cracker systems is based on Gröbner bases that are
infeasible to calculate but theoretically finite. Work with infinite Gröbner bases isn’t as
prevalent with Rai’s work typically being what is referred to when talking about infinite
Gröbner bases, for example in [Bulygin (2005)] and [Cortés et al. (2007)].
In section 4.3 we will use an ideal whose basis can’t be converted into a Gröbner basis.
From this we will build a key exchange protocol based on the Polly Cracker scheme that
is covered in [Rai (2004)]. We wish to keep any encryption method as computationally
inexpensive as possible so the majority of the work will be done by the key exchange (if
data is being streamed for example we can’t afford time-consuming encryption methods).
The accompanying encryption function that will depend on the generated secret key is
conceptually very simple. Although the simplicity of it is an excellent feature, two more
advantages come with this specific choice of function; the first of which is the homomorphic
property. Addition is preserved under the encryption function regardless of which poly-
nomial space we work in. As for multiplication, we discuss how that can also be preserved
provided we are a little more careful in our choice of polynomial space. The remainder of
this section will focus on our efforts to strengthen the scheme against a potential attack.
Braid groups are another structure that have been studied for their cryptographic poten-
tial [Flores & Kahrobaei (2017)] and are the justification of the second advantage of our
choice of encryption function which we will look at in more detail in section 4.4. Hecke
algebras are connected to braid groups and having both addition and multiplication op-
erations make it a good candidate for the choice of polynomial space to work in. This
section will show how we can upgrade our scheme. With this particular setup, the en-
cryption function will output a polynomial that has similar properties to instances of the
conjugacy problem from braid groups. This will hopefully give our method an extra level
of security from other potential attacks.
Testing of the work in this chapter was done using the functional programming language
Haskell. Using a language like this is helpful as programs are built up as a series of
functions, a more natural way to express the methods we use than an object-oriented
language like Java. This approach is of great importance as working with polynomials is
much slower than working with integers like a lot of current protocols. In particular, the
famous MapReduce method [Dean & Ghemawat (2008)] can be utilised to help speed up
operations over large amounts of ciphertexts. In this work, polynomials are represented as
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lists and the two MapReduce functions each perform fundamental changes to those lists.
• map - (k1, v1)→ list(k2, v2)
• reduce - (k2,list(v2))→ list(v2)
(k and v represent a key-value pair).
Finally, in chapter 5, we will look at the complexity of finding partial Gröbner bases.
Although we will see that there are certain ideal bases that have an infinite number of
polynomials in their Gröbner basis, it is only important to find the correct finite subset.
We, therefore, will look at the complexity of finding this subset as opposed to finding a
complete Gröbner basis.
When it comes to measuring complexity we need to be careful which measure we use. In
section 5.1 we will use the quicksort algorithm [Hoare (1961)] as an example to understand
the various measures. While something like worst-case complexity will tell us if a particular
hard problem does have hard instances, it isn’t much use if there is only one or a very
small number of examples. It is therefore tempting to use something like average-case
complexity which, as the name suggests, will give an indication of on average how hard a
type of problem is. The issue here is the fact that in statistics it is well known that the
mean value is rather sensitive to outliers. Just one example of an extremely hard instance
of a problem may cause the average to come across as still hard, as demonstrated in figure
1.2. As such we will look at generic complexity as our measure. This will discount outlying
difficult problems and give us a better idea of the complexity of the majority of instances.
In order to gain confidence in the security of the protocol from the previous chapter, we
want to show the complexity of the ideal membership problem is at least exponential. The
algorithm for finding Gröbner basis, known as Mora’s algorithm, is an iterative method
made up of two main steps during each iteration. The first step is finding new candidates
for the basis and adding them to a queue. The second step involves testing the polynomial
next in the queue to see if it would be redundant to add to what will become the Gröbner
basis.
Section 5.2 onwards will cover our approach to finding the generic complexity of the
problem we based the protocol in chapter 4 on. In particular in section 5.2 we will outline
the theorem for Gröbner bases in general. In sections 5.3 and 5.4 we will apply the theorem
we established in 5.2 to the Gröbner basis we will be using throughout chapter 4.
It is very difficult to model the polynomials needed for the basis, we therefore will begin
by focusing on one observation that can be made about the first step of Mora’s algorithm.
Following this, we will make an assumption about the second step however, we will discuss
three different approaches that provide evidence that our assumption may well hold. The
observation we make will put a lower bound on the number of polynomials that is still
exponential. While we will be covering a particular example for this observation, we will
make it clear how the proof can be applied to other examples and, in particular, which
8
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Figure 1.2: Comparison of measures of complexity
properties need to be there for the proof to hold. As for the assumption in step 2, we
claim that a certain proportion of polynomials in the queue will be added to the basis.
We try to back this claim up with the 3 following approaches:
• Simulations in Haskell,
• Re-ordering the queue of polynomials each time to better understand the structure,
• Classify the polynomials into one of 3 types and consider how the distribution of





Definition. A binary operation on a set S is a function ∗ : S × S → S that sends the
ordered pair (a, b) to (a ∗ b) ∈ S.
By imposing axioms on a set equipped with a binary operation we get the following
definitions.
Definition. A monoid is a set M , with a binary operation ∗ such that the following
conditions hold.
• Associativity: m1 ∗ (m2 ∗m3) = (m1 ∗m2) ∗m3 for all m1,m2,m3 ∈M .
• Identity: There exists an element e ∈ M such that for all m ∈ M , we have m ∗ e =
e ∗m = m. The element e is called the identity of M .
Associativity is an important and useful property to have when it comes to evaluating
expressions on parallel machines. Figure 2.1 shows how the parse tree for an expression can
be reduced by taking advantage of associativity [Kuck (1977)]. In the diagram, originally
the first step adds together a and b, the second step adds c and the third step adds d.
However, because c and d don’t depend on a and b, two additions can be performed at
the same time. Then, by the associative property, the result of these sums can be added
together to get the same result as before one step earlier.
The free monoid on a set is the monoid whose elements are words made up of zero or more
elements from that set. The binary operation on this particular monoid is a concatenation
of words, with the empty word made up of zero elements, denoted e, as the identity.
Definition. A group is a monoid G, with identity e and with the following further prop-
erty.
• Inverse: For each element g ∈ G, there exists an element g−1 ∈ G such that g−1∗g =
e = g ∗ g−1. The element g−1 is called the inverse of g.
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Figure 2.1: Tree reduction
Furthermore, we say that a group is abelian if for all g1, g2 ∈ G we have that g1∗g2 = g2∗g1.
Definition. A ring is a set R with 2 binary operations + and ×, which we call addition
and multiplication, with an identity element 0 for addition alongside the following axioms.
• R is an abelian group with respect to addition.
• (r1 × r2)× r3 = r1 × (r2 × r3) for all r1, r2, r3 ∈ R.
• Distributivity: r1×(r2+r3) = (r1×r2)+(r1×r3) and (r1+r2)×r3 = (r1×r3)+(r2×r3).
• Unit: There is a unique element 1 such that 1 6= 0 and 1 × r = r = r × 1 for all
r ∈ R.
Furthermore we say a commutative ring has all the above properties alongside
• r1 × r2 = r2 × r1.
The group structure brings with it one of the most important problems in modern
cryptography.
Definition. Discrete logarithm problem. Given a group G, let 〈g〉 be the cyclic subgroup
generated by g ∈ G and a ∈ 〈g〉, find an integer x such that
gx = a (2.1)
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2.2 Commutative and non-commutative polynomial rings
2.2.1 Monomials and orderings
Definition. The set of monomials in the variables {x1, x2, . . . , xn} is defined in the 2
following ways:
• Commutative: {xβ11 x
β2
2 · · ·x
βn
n |βi ∈ N ∪ {0}},
• Non-Commutative: {xi1xi2 · · ·xik |i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, k ∈ N ∪ {0}}, namely
elements of the free monoid on the set {x1, x2, . . . , xn},







For testing purposes, implementation of polynomial rings were created in Haskell. The
differences between the commutative and non-commutative versions become very clear
here. The commutative monomials are described with just a list of integers representing
the exponents, whereas the non-commutative monomials require lists of tuples made up
of the variable and a list of its positions in the monomial.
Example The following are examples of how the monomial x1x
2
3x2x1 ∈ {x1, x2, x3, x4} in
the 2 implementations of monomials in Haskell:
• Commutative: [2, 1, 2, 0],
• Non-commutative: [(x1, [1, 5]), (x2, [4]), (x3, [2, 3])].
Note here that in the commutative case we have collected all the variables with the same
index together by moving the x1 at the end of the monomial to the front. Also in the
non-commutative version, we have not included an x4 in the definition at all as it doesn’t
appear in the monomial, something we can’t do with the commutative case.
The problem we will be dealing with in a later chapter requires us to have an ordering
on our collection of monomials. While there are many orderings to choose from. The
following definitions will be a common theme.
Definition. A set X is totally ordered under ≤ if the following properties hold for any
xi, xj , xk ∈ X:
• Antisymmetry: xi ≤ xj and xj ≤ xi ⇒ xi = xj ,
• Transitivity: xi ≤ xj and xj ≤ xk ⇒ xi ≤ xk,
• Totality: xi ≤ xj or xj ≤ xi.
Definition. An admissible order is a total order on the set of monomials satisfying the
following property:
xi ≤ xj ⇒ xixk ≤ xjxk, for all monomials xi, xj , xk. (2.2)
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Often these orders are required to be well-orders as well. If we have finite variables, then
the conditions are:
• The order is a total order
• For any monomial xi, we have 1 ≤ xi.
For the following definitions assume that the 2 monomials, m1,m2 ∈ {x1, x2, . . . , xn},





2 · · ·x
αn




2 · · ·x
βn
n , (2.3)
for the commutative case. The non-commutative case will be of the form
m1 = xi1xi2 · · ·xik ,m2 = xj1xj2 · · ·xjk′ . (2.4)
For each definition we will assume the order on the variables is x1 > x2 > · · · > xn.
Definition. Under the lexicographical ordering, m1 < m2 if
• (Commutative) ∃i ≤ n with αi < βi, and then αj = βj for 1 ≤ j < i,
• (Non-commutative) Either ∃l′ ≤ min{k, k′} with αi′l < βj′l and then αil = βjl for
1 ≤ l < l′, or k < k′, and then αil = βjl for 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
The commutative definition is admissible whereas the non-commutative definition is not
admissible (e.g. let x1 > x2, then x1 < x1x2 but x
2
1 > x1x2x1).
Definition. Under the degree lexicographical ordering, m1 < m2 if
• (Commutative) deg(m1) =
∑n
i=1 αi < deg(m2) =
∑n
i=1 βi or deg(m1) = deg(m2)
and m1 < m2 under the lexicographical ordering,
• (Non-commutative) deg(m1) = k < deg(m2) = k′ or deg(m1) = deg(m2) and m1 <
m2 under the lexicographical ordering.
Both of these definitions are admissible.
Definition. Under the degree reverse lexicographical ordering, m1 < m2 if
• (Commutative) deg(m1) < deg(m2) or deg(m1) = deg(m2) and αi > βi with all
following exponents are equal (αj = βj , i < j ≤ n),
• (Non-commutative) deg(m1) < deg(m2) or deg(m1) = deg(m2) and working from
right to left of both words, the first letter where m1 and m2 differ, say i1and i2
respectively, is such that i1 > i2.
Neither of these definitions are admissible.
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2.2.2 Ideals
Definition. If I is a subset of a commutative ring (R,+, ·), it is called an ideal of R if:
• (I,+) is a subgroup of (R,+)
• ∀x ∈ I, ∀r ∈ R : rx ∈ I
Definition. If I is a subset of a non-commutative ring (R,+, ·), it is called a left (right)
ideal of R if:
• (I,+) is a subgroup of (R,+)
• ∀x ∈ I, ∀r ∈ R : rx ∈ I(xr ∈ I)
Definition. If I is a subset of a non-commutative ring (R,+, ·), it is called a two sided
ideal of R if:
• (I,+) is a subgroup of (R,+)
• ∀x ∈ I, ∀r1, r2 ∈ R : r1xr2 ∈ I
Definition. Given a two sided ideal I of a ring R, an equivalence relation ∼ on R, for
a, b ∈ R, is defined as
a ∼ b if and only if a− b ∈ I. (2.5)
Definition. Given a ring R, an ideal I in R and a ∈ R, the equivalence class of a in R is
[a] = a+ I = {a+ r|r ∈ I}. (2.6)
Definition. Given an ideal I in R, the set of all equivalence classes called the quotient
ring denoted R/I. It in itself is a ring with addition and multiplication defined as
(a+ I) + (b+ I) = (a+ b) + I,
(a+ I)(b+ I) = (ab) + I,
(2.7)
where a, b ∈ R.
2.2.3 Leading terms
Polynomials will be a key structure used in our encryption methods and thus it is important
to understand some of the key properties of them. Let K be a field, let M be a monoid.
The monoid ring of M over K is the set K〈M〉 of all elements of the form
∑
w∈M cww
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Given a set X, the monoid ring of 〈X〉 over K is called the non-commutative polynomial
ring [Xiu (2012)]. Furthermore, we define the commutative polynomial ring as the quotient
ring of the non-commutative polynomial ring K〈X〉/I where I = 〈uv = vu ∀u, v ∈ X〉.
A lot of the algorithms described later are interested with the various leading parts of
polynomial. The key components are given here [Adams et al. (1994)].






2 · · ·x
β1,n




2 . . . x
βm,n
n ,
g = a1xi1,1xi2,1 · · ·xik1,1 + · · ·+ amxi1,mxi2,m · · ·xikm,m ,
(2.10)
under some order, have there terms expressed in descending order. We define
• LM(f) = xβ1,11 x
β1,2
2 · · ·x
β1,n
n , the leading monomial of f ,
LM(g) = xi1,1xi2,1 · · ·xik1,1 , the leading monomial of g,
• LC(f) =LC(g) = a1, the leading coefficient of f and g,




2 . . . x
β1,n
n , the leading term of f ,
LM(g) = a1xi1,1xi2,1 · · ·xik1,1 , the leading term of g.
2.2.4 Building Hecke algebras
In chapter 4, we will be interested in a particular algebraic structure, namely the Hecke
algebra. We will give the details of the algebra here and use this to improve on an
encryption scheme later.
Definition. A Coxeter system is a pair (W,S), where S = {s1, s2, . . . , sr} are generators
of a Coxeter group W defined by the presentation
〈s1, s2, . . . , sr|(sisj)mi,j = 1〉, (2.11)
where mi,i = 1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, mi,j ≥ 2 for i 6= j, and can equal ∞.
The Bruhat ordering is a partial order on the elements of a Coxeter group.
Definition. If (W,S) is a Coxeter with generators S, then the (strong) Bruhat order is
the partial order on the group W , defined by u ≤ v if some substring of some reduced
word for v is a reduced word for u. A reduced word for an element of W is a minimal
length expression of the element as a product of elements of S.
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Another important group for this section is the Braid group which has a standard
presentation defined as follows.




∣∣∣∣ σiσj = σjσi, for |i− j| ≥ 2σiσi+1σi = σi+1σiσi+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
〉
(2.12)
Several problems arising from presentations of groups have been suggested as the
premise for cryptosystems. One in particular of interest is the conjugacy search problem.
Definition. (Conjugacy search problem) Given conjugate elements u,w ∈ Bn, find v ∈ Bn
such that
w = v−1uv. (2.13)
There have been protocols already suggested based on conjugacy search problems
in braid groups. For example, a scheme based on the Diffie Hellman conjugacy prob-
lem has been presented, where the hardness of the brute force attack is proportional to
exp{12pnlog(n)}, where the size of a plaintext is pnlog(n) bits [Ko et al. (2000)]. For this
particular scheme though, polynomial time attacks exist such as in [Cheon & Jun (2003)].
Although schemes based around these conjugacy problems have been broken, it is still
thought to be an open problem if the conjugacy search problem can be solved in general
for braid groups.
This problem leads to another similar problem which will help to justify the choice of
encryption function in chapter 4.
Definition. (Multiple conjugacy search problem) Given m pairs of conjugate elements
(u1, w1), . . . , (um, wm) ∈ Bn which are all conjugated by the same element. Find v ∈ Bn
such that
wi = v
−1uiv,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (2.14)
From a Coxeter group W we can form a Hecke algebra [Bump (2010)]. This is an
algebra over the ring of Laurent polynomials Z[q, q−1]. This algebra is denoted Hq(W ).
Much like the Coxeter group, given the Coxeter system (W,S), where |S| = r then the
Hecke algebra has generators T1, T2, . . . , Tr. For a generator Ti, the i represents the Coxeter
generator si from the Coxeter group W . If w = si1si2 · · · sin , where sij ∈ S±1, is a reduced
word in W then, we define Tw = Ti1Ti2 · · ·Tin . The generators are subject to the relation
(TiTj)
mi,j = TiTjTi · · · = TjTiTj · · · = (TjTi)mi,j , (2.15)
where there are mi,j copies of both Ti and Tj on each side. The relation s
2
i = 1 in the
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Coxeter group is replaced with the quadratic relation
T 2i = (q − 1)Ti + q. (2.16)
If w = w1w2 in W and length(w) = length(w1) + length(w2) then Tw = Tw1Tw2 .
2.3 Symmetric and Asymmetric encryption techniques
It is common practice to make public the encryption method used on data. If Alice and Bob
wish to encrypt messages in such a way that the other can decrypt, they can agree on the
scheme used in an open channel. The key that is used in the encryption function, however,
must be kept secret otherwise any ciphertext produced will be immediately insecure. A
key exchange protocol is used to allow Alice and Bob to communicate a shared secret key
despite using an open channel.
Figure 2.2 gives an overview of how key exchanges are performed. Alice and Bob each
begin by choosing a secret piece of information PA and PB respectively. They combine
their information with some publicly known information Pk and send each other the results
i.e. Bob receives Pk(PA) and Alice receives Pk(PB). Finally, they combine their secret key
with the information they have received, resulting in the shared key Pk(PA, PB). It should
be difficult for an eavesdropper to calculate Pk(PA, PB) based on Pk(PA) and Pk(PB),







Figure 2.2: Key exchange process
A well-known example is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. It is performed with the
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following method:
1. Alice and Bob publicly agree on two prime numbers g and p, where g is a primitive
root of p (every value from 1 to p− 1 is congruent to a power of g mod p).
2. Alice chooses in secret a value a and from that calculates A = ga mod(p). She then
sends A over the public channel to Bob. Bob does the same with b and B = gb
mod(p).
3. Alice can now calculate Ba mod(p) = gba mod(p) which is equal to Ab mod(p) = gab
mod(p) that Bob can calculate.
It is thought to be difficult for an eavesdropper to find gab mod(p) given the public infor-
mation g, p, ga mod(p) and gb mod(p).
The term symmetric used to describe the previous method refers to the fact that Alice
and Bob have the same information at the end of the process. They are therefore able to
encrypt and decrypt messages under the same scheme. Asymmetric schemes differ in that
one party may be able to encrypt and decrypt but, one or more other parties are only
able to encrypt. Figure 2.3 gives an example of multiple users encrypting their data and
sending it to the service. The service is able to decrypt the information but if the users












Figure 2.3: Multiple user public key encryption
The RSA encryption method (named after its creators Rivest, Shamir, Adleman), is
a well known and widely used example of an asymmetric encryption scheme. The public
key is a modulus n and an exponent e both positive integers. The modulus n = pq where
p and q are primes. The ciphertext c is generated from a plaintext m by the encryption
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function E defined as
c = E(m) = me(mod n). (2.17)
Here n is the product of two primes p and q, both of which are kept secret. We choose a
value of e that satisfies both 1 < e < λ(n) and gcd(e, λ(n)) = 1 where λ(n) is the smallest
positive integer m such that
am ≡ 1 (mod n), (2.18)
for every integer a from 1 to n that is co-prime to n. The function is implemented efficiently
using the method of repeated squaring.
The decryption function, D, on a ciphertext c is defined by
m = D(c) = cd(mod n), (2.19)
where ed ≡ 1(mod λ(pq)).
Without knowledge of the private key, an attacker needs to be able to factorise n to
break the cryptosystem. If an attacker can find p and q such that n = pq then they
can easily calculate λ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). With knowledge of λ(n), it is easy to find
d using the Euclidean algorithm. Currently, in classical computing, it is believed that
prime factorisation does not have an efficient algorithm to solve it, thus RSA is considered
secure.
2.4 Homomorphic encryption
Definition. Let (G, ∗) and (H, ◦) be groups. A function f : G 7→ H is a homomorphism
if ∀a, b ∈ G,
f(a ∗ b) = f(a) ◦ f(b). (2.20)
Furthermore, we say that we have an isomorphism if the homomorphism is bijective i.e.
it is injective (1 to 1) and surjective (onto). If we have an isomorphism f : G 7→ H, then
we write G ∼= H.
A lot of work has been carried out in group theoretic homomorphic encryption. For
example, the homomorphic property in RSA is satisfied by using the commutativity of
integer multiplication.
E(m1) · E(m2) = me1 ·me2(mod n)
= (m1 ·m2)e(mod n)
= E(m1 ·m2).
(2.21)
While the homomorphic property of RSA does appear to be a useful property of an already
well respected encryption system, it is worth thinking about real world restrictions of such
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a property would be. To see this consider the following function
Definition. Given c = me(mod n)
HALF (c) =
{
0, if 0 ≤ m < n/2
1, if n/2 ≤ m < n− 1.
(2.22)
The reason there is interest in a definition such as this is that it can be used to
show that the homomorphic property of RSA can be seen as a double edged sword. The
homomorphic property of the RSA means that if we have access to an oracle for HALF ()
then, given c = me and e we can compute the following:
HALF (me) = 0⇔ m ∈ [0, n
2
)




























Using such a binary search approach means that it is possible to establish the value of m
in polynomial time, by computing values of HALF (2ime) for various i. Fortunately, there
is currently no well known polynomial time algorithm to implement HALF, but the point
here is that there are lots of potential ways for information about messages to be leaked
and it would only take one to be established in reality for there to be a major security
concern.
Alongside RSA, other encryption methods are homomorphic under a single operation. For
example, the Paillier encryption method is homomorphic under addition. A more desirable
property for an encryption method to have is a ring homomorphism.
Definition. Given two rings, R and S, a ring homomorphism is a function f : R → S
such that
• f(a+ b) = f(a) + f(b)∀a, b ∈ R.
• f(ab) = f(a)f(b)∀a, b,∈ R.
• f(1R) = 1s, the multiplicative identity in each ring.
2.4.1 Fully homomorphic encryption
The ultimate goal of homomorphic cryptography is to be able to perform any operation
on encrypted data homomorphically. This is known as Fully homomorphic encryption.
Ideally, these operations on ciphertext would be performed with as little extra effort as it
would have been to perform on the original ciphertext. In order to achieve this, we would
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like to have a collection of operations that can be built up into any given operation.
Gentry proposed in his paper [Gentry (2009)], an encryption method that would allow the
evaluation of arbitrary circuits. His protocol allowed evaluation of addition and multipli-
cation gates on encrypted data in a ring. The reason this is so important is that we are
able to construct Boolean algebra. The values in this algebra may be identified with inte-
ger arithmetic modulo 2. Here addition plays the Boolean role of XOR and multiplication
plays the Boolean role of AND. Computers perform all operations through a series of logic
gates, where each gate performs a Boolean operation. Therefore, any operation we wish
to perform on any data will be an application of the Boolean algebra. This is why finding
a ring theoretic encryption method is of such value.
2.5 Implementation considerations
2.5.1 Classical computation
Different types of attacks
Not every potential attacker will be looking for a full break of a cryptosystem. Even
without knowledge of the secret key, there may still be important information to be learned
from various aspects of the protocol.
A chosen-plaintext attack is a type of attack that tries to gain information about an
encryption scheme assuming a given arbitrary plaintext, they can find the corresponding
ciphertext.
A known-plaintext attack is a type of attack that tries to gain information using the fact
that the attacker knows the plaintext version of a particular ciphertext. This is a weaker
attack than the previous one as a chosen-plaintext attack doesn’t have to wait for a specific
ciphertext to appear naturally.
A chosen-ciphertext attack is a type of attack that tries to gain information by having the
attacker learn the decryption of a chosen ciphertext.
Optimal asymmetric encryption padding
Definition. A trapdoor function is a function that is easy to compute but the inverse is
believed to be difficult to compute.
RSA is thought to be a trapdoor function. Bellare and Rogaway put forward a scheme
in the 90’s which could convert any trapdoor function into an encryption scheme [Manger
(2001)]. RSA led the way with this method resulting in the RSA-OAEP scheme, this
provides more security advantages than just the standard RSA scheme. We will discuss
the scheme here and use f to represent the trapdoor function, so one could easily substitute
RSA in here.
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Setup
Here we will assume that the data is in binary format. Our trapdoor function f : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}k, has an inverse g. We also require two other parameters k0 and k1 which are
sufficiently large but satisfy k0 + k1 < k. Now although our trapdoor function acts on k
bits, the scheme itself encrypts messages of the form m = {0, 1}n, where n = k − k0 − k1.
Two arbitrary functions are also incorporated
H : {0, 1}n+k1 → {0, 1}k0 and G : {0, 1}k0 → {0, 1}n+k1 (2.24)
Encryption
If we wish to encrypt a plaintext m, we begin by randomly generating r ∈ {0, 1}k0 . We
then proceed to calculate
s = G(r)⊕ (m||0k1) ∈ {0, 1}n+k1
t = H(s)⊕ r ∈ {0, 1}k0
w = s||t ∈ {0, 1}k
c = f(w) ∈ {0, 1}k is the ciphertext
(2.25)
where || represents concatenation of bits.
Decryption
w = g(c) ∈ {0, 1}k
s = w[0, . . . , n+ k1 − 1] ∈ {0, 1}n+k1
t = w[n+ k1, . . . , k] ∈ {0, 1}k0
r = H(s)⊕ t ∈ {0, 1}k0
z = G(r)⊕ s ∈ {0, 1}n+k1
m = z[0, . . . , n− 1] ∈ {0, 1}n is the plaintext
y = z[n, . . . , n+ k1 − 1] ∈ {0, 1}k1
(2.26)
where the values in [ ] represent the bit positions of the variable in front of the brackets.
These added steps provide us with an added level of security. Whilst the trapdoor function
should prevent outsiders from finding the plain text information, there may be a goal
of simply tampering the data. This could be done if the adversary just had access to
the ciphertext data by changing some of the 1’s to 0’s and vice versa. In classic RSA,
when decrypted this, in theory, would just output a different value where anyone without
knowledge of the plaintext would simply accept this as being the truth. However, in RSA-
OAEP alongside the plaintext that is returned, we also get back y. Now we expect this
to be a string of k1 0’s so if that is not what we observe then we know that the ciphertext
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has been changed in some way.
Computation limitations
In almost any scenario, but in particular, for IOT, we want to keep computational costs
and bandwidth use as low as we can. As such it is highly recommended that symmetric
key algorithms are used for encrypting data as asymmetric schemes have relatively heavy
computational costs. As the number of entities in a system grows, it becomes exceedingly
difficult to distribute shared secret keys manually. Therefore we need support from auto-
mated key-establishment schemes. This is where Asymmetric encryption schemes shine,
as demonstrated in figure 2.4. The public part of a key pair generated in this scheme can
be used by another party wishing to establish a secret key with the key pair owner. The
other party encrypts their choice of shared secret key using the public key and the key
pair owner is the only who can retrieve that information with their private key. One of
the NIST-approved asymmetric schemes is RSA. Any RSA key-pair generated will have a
modulus n, with a length of either 2048 or 3072 bits, where n is the product of two primes.















Figure 2.4: Mixing public and private key methods
The following two algorithms are the NIST-approved choices for encryption.
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can
process blocks of 128 bits with use of cipher keys of length either 128, 192 or 256 bits.
Any implementation of AES must support at least one of those 3 key lengths.
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) encrypts and decrypts data in 64-bit blocks
using 56-bit keys. Although there are 2 variants of these methods, the use of two-key
TDEA is no longer approved (three-key TDEA being the approved alternative).
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2.5.2 Quantum computation
A qubit can be in one of two states |0〉 and |1〉 or it can be in a superposition of states
represented by the linear combination
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 where α, β ∈ C. (2.27)
The values α and β represent probabilities of what we will observe when we measure the
qubit. We get a value of 0 with probability |α|2 and a value of 1 with probability |β|2,
thus giving us the condition |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. The states |0〉 and |1〉 are known as the
computational basis states.






when measured, has a 50/50 change of being a 0 or a 1.
Suppose we have 2 qubits. A 2 qubit system has 4 computational basis states denoted
|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉 and a superposition of these states can be written as
|ψ〉 = α00|00〉+ α01|01〉+ α10|10〉+ α11|11〉 (2.29)
where the coefficients are normalized in the same way as done with one qubit. An impor-




The interesting property about this state is that if we measure the first qubit, we get the
value of 0 with a probability of a half (same as 1) but from this point the complete state
has been decided, since the first qubit can only be followed by the same value.
There is a quantum version of the NOT gate in classical computing. In classical
computing, this sends 0 to 1 and vice versa. We treat this the same in the quantum world,








which is multiplied to our quantum state α|0〉+ β|1〉 using the normal matrix and vector
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Surprisingly the only requirement on quantum gates is that the matrix representation must
be unitary. A matrix U is unitary if U †U = I (the dagger notation represents the adjoint
















Finally, two gates that will be of particular importance in this work will be the CNOT
gate and the Toffoli gate. Firstly the CNOT gate is defined as
CNOT ≡

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 . (2.35)
The first qubit is fixed and acts as a control variable. If it is a 1 the second qubit swaps
its value (0 becomes 1 or 1 becomes 0).
The Toffoli gate is defined as
Toffoli ≡

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

. (2.36)
Similar to the CNOT gate, the first two qubits are fixed and act as control variables, the
third qubit is swapped if both the control qubits are equal to 1. As you can see here,
the matrix transformations used can get large quickly. In the quantum world, there are
various proofs that as few as 2 quantum gates is enough to perform any calculation up to





In this chapter, we will consider how quantum computing can be used to change what
cryptographic tools we have at our disposal. The first section will focus on existing work
that has looked at a post-quantum world. This is compiled of work by; Shor, on attacking
the widely used RSA, work by Bennett and Brassard on using quantum technology to
form a key exchange and work by Goldreich Goldwasser and Halevi on a cryptosystem
that is more resistant to quantum attacks than something like RSA.
Section 2 will begin with an important quantum circuit by Takahashi. This will enable
the remainder of the original work in the section which looks to improve the homomorphic
properties of the quantum-resistant method previously mentioned.
Sections 3 and 4 are built off the foundations set in section 2 and aim to improve the
method to be more practical.
3.1 Effects of quantum methods on cryptography
In this section, we will look at some of the ways we already know quantum computers will
change cryptography. Firstly, we will see how a widely used problem becomes insecure
with the aid of quantum algorithms. After which, we will see how other algorithms, both
quantum and classical, will have a major interest in them. This interest may stem from
the opportunity to use these new computers (in the case of quantum algorithms), or the
need to replace insecure algorithms (in the case of classical algorithms).
3.1.1 Classical methods are vulnerable to quantum attacks
The discrete logarithm problem has been utilised widely within modern public-key cryp-
tography as the basis of security [McCurley (1990)]. While it has become the standard for
many real-world security systems, there are limitations. Firstly, while encryption methods
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such as RSA, that exist in the ring of integers containing (Z, ·), are homomorphic with
respect to multiplication, the addition operation won’t perform correctly. We see that in
almost every choice of e and n that
E(m1 +m2) = (m1 +m2)
e(mod n) 6= me1 +me2 (mod n) = E(m1) + E(m2). (3.1)
This is likely to be the case with similar cryptosystems that come from abelian groups
which leads our search to other algebraic structures. In this work we will consider vector
spaces and rings for fully homomorphic encryption, however, [Ostrovsky & Skeith (2008)]
proves that constructing an FHE over a ring with identity is equivalent to constructing a
group homomorphic encryption over a finite non-abelian simple group. The second issue,
however, is the major issue we need to address when considering quantum computers.
This issue is the assumption that decryption is hard. RSA belongs to a collection of
cryptosystems that base their security on the discrete logarithm problem, which we defined
in chapter 2.
While the discrete logarithm problem isn’t the only difficult problem forming a basis for
these systems, there exists polynomial time algorithms that convert to problems such as
factoring.
The development of Shor’s algorithm has put cryptosystems that utilize problems like
the discrete logarithm in jeopardy [Shor (1994)]. This is due to the efficiency of modular
exponentiation using repeated squaring and the quantum Fourier transform, the latter of
which, as the name suggests, may be performed using quantum algorithms.
This exploitable weakness and the possibility of quantum computers becoming available
in our life leads us to look for so-called quantum resistant cryptosystems.
While Shor’s algorithm may be one of the most prolific quantum attacks, there is evidence
of other weaknesses in classical methods from quantum attacks. In classical computing,
we consider an oracle that is able to obtain important details about a private key for
an attacker and try to understand how a scheme may deal with the attacker using that
information. However, In the quantum world an attacker may be able to use a quantum
oracle i.e. they can query the oracle with a superposition of classical queries [Boneh et al.
(2011)].
3.1.2 A key exchange protocol
Unlike traditional key exchange protocols that base their security on a problem thought
to be hard, fundamental properties of quantum mechanics are used to keep data safe in
quantum cryptography. In this section, we will look at a very early example from Bennett
and Brassard [BENNETT (1984)].
Although it is typical to use the standard basis for working with qubits, there is nothing
to stop Alice and Bob using another basis for communicating a secret key. In fact, the key
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exchange protocol described here requires the use of 2 bases. The main requirement of
these basis elements is that they are conjugate to one another. Although the terminology
differs from that here, [Bennett et al. (1992)] describes the important property of conjugate
bases as “any measurement of a single photon’s rectilinear (0 vs 90 degrees) polarization
randomizes its diagonal (45 vs 135 degrees) polarization, and vice versa”.
Recall that in our standard basis, any qubit is represented as
α|0〉+ β|1〉, (3.2)
where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. Upon measurement of this qubit we have a probability of |α|2 or
|β|2 of outputting a 0 or 1 respectively. Now consider an alternative basis, which we will








As with the standard basis, here we have a probability of |α′|2 or |β′|2 of a measurement




. Now suppose we have one of the diagonal
basis elements but try to measure it using the standard basis. Expressed as a sum of the
















Notice that in both cases we have an equal probability of observing a 0 or a 1. We can do
























Once again, in both cases, we have an equal probability of observing a 0 or 1. We call
bases with this property conjugate. We will adopt the notation here that the standard
basis elements |0〉 and |1〉 are written as the vectors [1, 0]t and [0, 1]t respectively. Also,






















Alice and Bob publicly agree to use the same two conjugate bases. Alice then chooses a
sequence of 0’s and 1’s she wished to transmit. Qubits used to represent these values are










For each qubit received, Bob chooses at random, one of the two conjugate bases and takes
a measurement. Alice does not publicly reveal anything about her choice of basis at this
point. If Bob’s choice of basis matches Alice’s, then when he measures he will observe the
value that Alice intended. If opposite bases are chosen, then as we saw above, Bob will
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observe the 0 or 1 element from his basis with equal probability (i.e. he has a 50% chance
of observing the value Alice intended).
Once all transmission has finished, Alice and Bob can publicly discuss which bases they
used for each qubit. For a qubit where they have a match, they can confirm that have
communicated successfully a 0 or 1. The qubits where they disagree are discarded. An
example of this process is given in the following table. In the table, a + is used to represent
the standard basis whereas a × is used to represent the diagonal basis.
Alice message 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1






































































Shared key? 0 1 0 1
The question remains, what about outsiders trying to eavesdrop on this information
exchange? Suppose an attacker tries to interfere before the qubits reach Bob. Much like
Bob, the attacker must choose one of the two bases to measure in. Assume here that Bob
and Alice are using the same basis as anything else would be thrown away and therefore
useless to the attack anyway. If the attacker also happens to choose the same basis, then
the qubit will have been measured and sent to Bob, whose measurement will essentially
be a redundant step but it will be the intended value. If the non-matching basis is chosen,
a measurement has a 50/50 chance of still giving the correct value. This means that if an
attack takes place, the is only a 25% chance of each value in the shared secret sequence
being incorrect.
As an example, suppose Alice sends a 0 in the standard basis i.e. [1, 0]t. With 50%
probability, Eve also chooses to measure in the standard basis and so the exchange looks
like this
Alice sends [1, 0]t → Eve’s measurement [1, 0]t
Eve sends [1, 0]t → Bob’s measurement [1, 0]t.
(3.6)
The other scenario is that Eve chooses to measure Alice’s message using the diagonal basis.
Eve, therefore, has two possible measurements. After forwarding the message on to Bob,
who is using the standard basis, he has also has two potential measurements. The four
potential scenarios are:
1.












]t → Bob’s measurement [1, 0]t.
(3.7)
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2.












]t → Bob’s measurement [0, 1]t.
(3.8)
3.












]t → Bob’s measurement [1, 0]t.
(3.9)
4.












]t → Bob’s measurement [0, 1]t.
(3.10)
Of these four possible outcomes, only two of them would give Bob reason to believe that
the qubits have been tampered with.
For Bob and Alice to check if any eavesdropping has occurred, they will need to publicly
compare the values they have at certain positions to see if any don’t match, which will then
need to be discarded. If there are differences then there has been some kind of attack and
the process must be restarted. The problem here, however, comes to down the possibility
that the values they choose may have been seen by an attacker but just so happened
to remain correct. Choosing more and more values to compare will help decrease this
probability but it would always be impossible to say for certain there has been no attack.
3.1.3 A post-quantum somewhat homomorphic encryption system
In this section, we look at what is known as a somewhat homomorphic encryption sys-
tem (SHE). This class of cryptosystem allows encrypted data to be processed but each
operation introduces some error. The number of additions that can be performed on the
encrypted data, with correct decryption, is bounded as the error will grow too large to deal
with. The scheme is work in this particular section is a brief introduction to the scheme
presented in [Goldreich et al. (1997)]. Here we will study a problem that is thought to be
difficult to solve even with quantum computers, followed by an encryption scheme built off
that problem. Later in the chapter, we will look at an error correcting method to extend
the number of additions that can be performed, We will do this by creating a superposition
of all possible encryptions of a plaintext and manipulating this appropriately.
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Closest vector problem
To study this problem, we first we must establish some important definitions. A lattice is




aixi|ai ∈ Z}. (3.11)




2 + · · ·+ v2d is the Euclidean norm. We will also need
the following dist function
dist(x, L) = min{||x− y|| : y ∈ L}. (3.12)
Our next step is to define an object that will allow us to further our understanding of




αixi | 0 ≤ αi < 1 | i = 1, ..., d}, (3.13)
is the fundamental parallelepiped of the lattice Λ [Barvinok (2002)]. Once again for us
to visualize this we will consider a lattice in R2 with a basis (0, 1) and (1, 0). The paral-
lelepiped will take the following form:
(0,1)
(1,0)
The intervals from (0, 0) to (1, 0) and (0, 0) to (0, 1) are both contained in the parallelepiped
whereas the intervals from (1, 0) to (1, 1) and (0, 1) to (1, 1) are not. Also, the point (0, 0)
is within the parallelepiped whereas the points (1, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1) are not. Thus, we
can translate the parallelepiped one unit in the direction of one of our basis vectors and
still have an empty intersection. At the same time the union of all these translations of
the basis vectors, z1(0, 1) + z2(1, 0), where z1, z2 ∈ Z, will be equal to R2. This gives a
partition of R2.
An important concept in this section is the idea of what makes a good or bad basis for a
lattice. A good basis is typically used as the private key for a system and the bad basis
used for the public key. The difference between the two bases is the difficulty in solving
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Integer lattice with basis (0, 1), (1, 0) Integer lattice with basis (1, 1), (4, 3)
Figure 3.1: Example good and bad basis
the closest vector problem. One way to explain the difference is through the use of the
following two diagrams [Silverman (2006)], where the blue point we want to find the close
lattice point.
Definition. Closest vector problem: Given a basis B of a lattice L = L(B) ⊂ Rn and a
vector x ∈ Rn (i.e. not necessarily an element of L), find u ∈ L such that
||x− u|| = dist(x, L). (3.14)
Given a lattice with a fixed basis and a point in the space we are working in, perhaps
there exists a parallelpiped which contains that point.
Definition. Given a lattice L generated by an n dimensional basis B, the Hadamard ratio
[Hoffstein et al. (2008)] of the basis is defined as
H(B) = (
|det(B)|
||b1||2 · ||b2||2 · · · ||bn||2
)1/n. (3.15)
Here det(B) represents the determinant of the matrix formed from the basis vectors of B.
Also ||bi||2 represents the Euclidean norm of the basis vector bi. The range of values for
this ratio is 0 < H(B) ≤ 1.
A good basis is one whose Hadamard ratio is close to 1. Consequently a bad basis is one
who Hadamard ratio is close to 0.
In figure 3.1, the left diagram represents a good basis. Here we can see that the
closest lattice point to our given point will be one of the corner points on the closure of
the fundamental parallelepiped. This makes solving the closest vector problem possible
in a reasonable amount of time. The right diagram represents a bad basis, where the
closest point on the parallelepiped is not the closest point on the lattice. Clearly, in two
dimensions we can spot the closest vector point, however, in higher dimensions, algorithms
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that solve this problem are exponential in complexity [Becker et al. (2013)] given a bad
basis.
The following encryption, named GGH (after its inventors Goldreich, Goldwasser and
Halevi), system is based on the closest vector problem [Goldreich et al. (1997)].
Setup
The GGH encryption system takes advantage of the closest vector problem where the
private key is a good basis R of a lattice (the letter R chosen to represent the fact that
this basis is more reduced than the public basis). The basis vectors r1, . . . , rn of this basis
are represented as the matrix
R =

r1,1 r1,2 · · · r1,n





rn,1 rn,2 · · · rn,n
 , (3.16)
where ri,j is the j
th element of ri.
The public key is a bad basis B for the same lattice, alongside the dimension n and a
security parameter σ ∈ Z. σ should be chosen to be small enough that the ciphertext
remains closer to the intended lattice point than any other lattice point. The basis vectors
b1, . . . ,bn of this basis are represented as the matrix
B =

b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,n





bn,1 bn,2 · · · bn,n
 , (3.17)
where bi,j is the j
th element of bi.
It has been suggested that an appropriate method to create a bad basis is to use the
Hermite Normal Form of the good basis [Micciancio (2001)], which is a upper triangular
matrix with all entries greater than or equal to 0. The diagonal elements in particular are
strictly greater than all other values in the same row. Micciancio recommends [Micciancio
& Warinschi (2001)] as an efficient way to generate the Hermite Normal Form.
Encryption
Express a message as a vector m ∈ Zn, then the ciphertext is computed as
c = Bm + e, (3.18)
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where e ∈ {−σ, σ}n (i.e. the set of 2 elements σ and -σ) is generated randomly each time
a ciphertext is sent.
Decryption
The ciphertext c is decrypted with the following formula
m = B−1RbR−1ce, (3.19)
where b.e rounds each element of the vector inside to the nearest integer. To see why this
method works, lets consider how the private key is utilized and what is left before the
inverse of the public key is used.
RbR−1ce = RbR−1(Bm + e)e
= R(R−1Bm + bR−1ee)
= Bm +RbR−1ee.
(3.20)
From this final form, it is clear that if bR−1ee = 0, a correct decryption will occur. This
is why the choice of σ is so crucial; increasing its size increases the chances of bR−1ee 6= 0.
For the purposes of this chapter we will always assume we have an appropriate choice of σ,
but for a more in depth look as to what that entails, refer to [Goldreich et al. (1997),van de
Pol (2011)].
Here the main concern is choosing a candidate value of e that is both not so“small” that
it is possible for someone to crack the decryption but at the same time not so “large” that
when we try to decrypt the message we end up with the wrong plain text.
3.2 Performing addition in an SHE while maintaining error
size
In this section, we will begin by looking at how addition can be performed on a quantum
computer, which preserves superpositions, using an example circuit from [Takahashi et al.
(2009)]. The remainder of the section covers a new method we introduce to adapt the GGH
encryption system, allowing us to theoretically perform an infinite number of additions
without risk of incorrect decryption.
3.2.1 Addition on a quantum circuit
Before new content, we need to understand the following work done by Takahashi et al.
We wish to be able to add quantum ciphertexts and therefore need a method to perform
addition on qubits. To perform the addition we will use the circuit discussed in [Takahashi
et al. (2009)] described just below. The total number of qubits input to this circuit is 2n+1.
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n is the maximum number of qubits of the two values we wish to add (if the other value has
fewer qubits then we pad with zeroes). The qubits A0, . . . , An−1 are binary representation
the first value B0, . . . , Bn−1 are the binary representation of the second value. The final
qubit An is there to act as a carry bit. While this circuit will output the same number of
qubits, only n+ 1 of them will represent the desired output.
1. For i = 1, · · · , n− 1:
Apply a CNOT gate to each pair of memory locations Bi and Ai where Ai is the
control qubit.
2. For i = n− 1, · · · , 1:
Apply a CNOT gate to each pair of memory locations Ai and Ai+1 where Ai is the
control qubit.
3. For i = 0, · · · , n− 1:
Apply a Toffoli gate to each tuple of memory locations Bi, Ai and Ai+1, where Bi
and Ai are the control qubits.
4. For i = n− 1, · · · , 1:
Apply a CNOT gate to each pair of memory locations Bi and Ai where Ai is the
control qubit, followed by applying a Toffoli gate to each tuple of memory locations
Bi−1, Ai−1 and Ai, where Bi−1 and Ai−1 are the control qubits.
5. For i = 1, · · · , n− 2:
Apply a CNOT gate to each pair of memory locations Ai and Ai+1 where Ai is the
control qubit.
6. For i = 0, · · · , n− 1:
Apply a CNOT gate to each pair of memory locations Bi and Ai where Ai is the
control qubit.
We will use  to denote this qubit addition operation.
The two gates of interest in this algorithm are the CNOT gate and the Toffoli gate.
The CNOT gate maps
|10〉 7→ |11〉 (3.21)
and
|11〉 7→ |10〉. (3.22)
The other basis vectors are fixed.
The Toffoli gate maps
|110〉 7→ |111〉 (3.23)
and
|111〉 7→ |110〉. (3.24)
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1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 3.2: Quantum addition for two 3 qubit values
All other basis vectors are fixed.
3.2.2 The problem with Somewhat homomorphic encryption
We look at what is known as a somewhat homomorphic encryption system. This class of
cryptosystem allows encrypted data to be processed but each operation introduces some
error. Only a finite number of operations can be performed on the encrypted data cor-
rectly as the error will grow too large to deal with.
Figure 3.3 demonstrates this problem within the GGH cryptosystem. Due to the dis-
tributive nature of matrix multiplication, only the additional error part of the encryption
formula prevents an exact homomorphism. The figure shows the possible accumulative
error of a ciphertext formed from each number of additions. The red dashed line represents
a hypothetical bound for guaranteed correct decryption, while the black line represents no
error. A good ciphertext should remain between these bounds, however, it is clear to see
that as computation goes on, the probability of an acceptable amount of error decreases.
We are thinking of GGH as a post-quantum cryptopsystem, however, it in itself is not a
quantum cryptosystem. The current version has does not depend on quantum properties.
In section 3.2.3 and onward we will adapt GGH to become a quantum cryptosysyem by
creating a superposition of all possible encryptions of a plaintext. From there we will
implement an error-correcting method to extend the number of additions that can be
performed. To keep the structure of the ciphertexts as simple as possible, we will choose
σ to be of the form 2k, k ∈ N.
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of error
3.2.3 Setting up a quantum variant of GGH
The remainder of the content in this chapter is new work contributed by the author. Our
aim is to have a superposition of all potential ciphertexts. We start with 2 plaintext
messages m1 = [m1,1,m1,2, . . . ,m1,n]
t and m2 = [m2,1,m2,2, . . . ,m2,n]
t. To begin with
consider the classical values after having only calculated the matrix multiplied on the left,
i.e. Bm, where B is the bad basis defined in equation (3.15). We now need to add the
error term on. We will do this in two stages. Instead of immediately adding e with entries
in {−2k, 2k}, we will express the error as
e = −2k[1, . . . , 1]t + e1, (3.25)
where e1 has entries in {0, 2k+1}.
We subtract the vector of 2k’s to begin with for ease of calculation. Suppose we have




and bi ∈ {0, 1}. The important observation here is that the difference in the binary
representations 0 and 2k only differ in the k + 1st bit. For example, 8 = 23 and its binary
representation contains a 1 in the 4th position. All other bits are 0. This is why we
subtracted 2k after performing the basis multiplication. Now, in the classical world, we
can choose a vector of length n, where each element of the vector comes from {0, 2k+1},
instead of {−2k, 2k}. Testing of this work was done with Microsoft’s liqui| > software
[Wecker & Svore (2014)], this step was taken to make the quantum operation a little
easier.
In the first stage of adding the error we subtract 2k from each value thus giving a valid
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encryption. This gives us 2 ciphertexts of the form
c−1 = Bm1 − 2
k =

B1,1m2,1 +B1,2m2,2 + · · ·+B1,nm2,n − 2k
B2,1m2,1 +B2,2m2,2 + · · ·+B2,nm2,n − 2k
...
Bn,1m2,1 +Bn,2m2,2 + · · ·+Bn,nm2,n − 2k
 (3.26)
and
c−2 = Bm2 − 2
k =

B1,1m2,1 +B1,2m2,2 + · · ·+B1,nm2,n − 2k
B2,1m2,1 +B2,2m2,2 + · · ·+B2,nm2,n − 2k
...
Bn,1m2,1 +Bn,2m2,2 + · · ·+Bn,nm2,n − 2k
 (3.27)
where 2k represents a vector of all 2k’s.
Our goal now is to have a ciphertext that is in a superposition of all possible variations of
the encryption. Now consider the binary representation of the numbers in our ciphertext
vector at this point, say the h-th element of c−1 and c
−
2 is bh,1,0bh,1,1 . . . bh,1,k, . . . and
bh,2,0bh,2,1 . . . bh,2,k, . . . respectively, where bh,i,j ∈ {0, 1}, h ∈ [1, n]. If we treat those bits
as qubits then performing the addition

|b1,i,0〉|b1,i,1〉 . . . |b1,i,k〉 . . .
|b2,i,0〉|b2,i,1〉 . . . |b2,i,k〉 . . .
...
|bn,i,0〉|bn,i,1〉 . . . |bn,i,k〉 . . .
+

|0〉|0〉 . . . |0〉+|1〉√
2
|0〉|0〉 . . . |0〉+|1〉√
2
...





|b1,i,0b1,i,1 . . . b1,i,k . . . 〉  |00 . . . 〉 |0〉+|1〉√2 · · ·
|b2,i,0b2,i,1 . . . b2,i,k . . . 〉  |00 . . . 〉 |0〉+|1〉√2 · · ·
...
|bn,i,0bn,i,1 . . . bn,i,k . . . 〉  |00 . . . 〉 |0〉+|1〉√2 · · ·

(3.28)
results in a superposition of all possible ciphertexts in the classical version. Here the
superposition is appearing at the same qubit position as the bh,i,k bit.
Due to the component wise property of vector addition, we will treat our vectors as if
they are length 1. We can therefore tidy up the notation of our bits from bh,i,j to bi,j .
Furthermore, because we are now dealing with vectors of length 1, we will drop the use of
the vector entirely whilst looking at the addition method.
Instead of dealing with cumbersome binary notation we may use the following notation
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3.2.4 Preventing an attacker from reversing the quantum gates used for
encryption
We stated in the previous section that any attempt to measure of a quantum ciphertext
would result in it collapsing down to the classical version. This approach therefore would
suggest that the quantum version is no easier to break than the classical version. Quantum
gates, however, are reversible and therefore provides reason to believe that if an encryption
method is public, an attacker could simply perform the gates in reverse order to undo the
encryption method. Let us consider an example using the quantum circuit from 3.2.
Example. Let a0a1a2 be the binary representation of a 3 bit plaintext, ready to add the












This is the input to step 1 of the process.







This is the input to step 2 of the process.




|a2(a2 ⊕ a1)a2a1(1− a1)a00〉√
2
. (3.33)
This is the input to step 3 of the process.




|(a2 ∧ a1)(a2 ⊕ a1)a2a1(1− a1)a00〉√
2
. (3.34)
This is the input to step 4 of the process.









. The first term
in the superposition comes from the fact a2⊕ a1⊕ a1 = a2. The target in the second term
of the superposition will never change as a1 and 1 − a1 cannot both equal 0. Also when
a3 is the target, the control values a2 and a2 ⊕ a1 can’t be be both equal to 1 if a1 = 1.
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|(a2 ∧ a1)(a2 ⊕ a1)a1a11a00〉√
2
. (3.35)
This is the input to step 5 of the process.






This is the input to step 6 of the process.




|(a2 ∧ a1)a2(a2 ⊕ a1)a1(1− a1)a0a0〉√
2
. (3.37)





|(a2 ∧ a1)(a2 ⊕ a1)(1− a1)a0〉√
2
. (3.38)
Although the qubits a2, a1 and a0 are not needed for further computation, the encryp-
tion circuit can only be reversed if the inputs are the values originally output. Therefore,
although we already have our ciphertext, there is one final step before moving data into a
public cloud. Recall that the X gate, defined in 2.5.2, swaps the probability of measuring
a 1 or 0 in a single qubit. Performing a random number of X gates on the a2, a1 and a0
qubits will produce a ciphertext that will output an incorrect plaintext if an eavesdropper
tries to reverse the encryption gates. Figure 3.4 shows the offline process where r0, r1
and r2 are positive integers chosen at random and kept secret. See appendix for a simple
example of a circuit encrypting 2 values then adding them together.












. In the classical version of
the algorithm, the error will be either σ ∈ Z or −σ. As we add other ciphertexts the error
will increase by σ or decrease by σ with equal probability. Figure 3.3 shows the potential
error values for each number of ciphertext additions. In particular after performing one



























Figure 3.4: Full offline process
where m = m1 + m2.
If the goal is to correct the error back to a standard ciphertext, the easiest place to
start would be adding or subtracting σ to each superposition of ciphertexts. This new



































7→ |Bm  (−σ)〉√
2
. (3.42)
If the error is of the form 2k, then the qubits we will look at to perform this transformation
in binary representation are positions k + 1 and k + 2. Because of the way these super-
positions are created, the qubits in the 2 positions of interest can be one of 4 forms. To
assist in working out which form we are looking at and correctly perform error correction,




b1,0b1,1b1,2 . . .
b2,0b2,1b2,2 . . .
...
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i.e. the ith element of the CTRL3 vector is a substring of the binary representation of the
ith element of Bm. When we add two ciphertexts together, the CTRL3 vectors are added
together and each element is reduced modulo 8. Denote row i of CTRL3 by CTRL3(i).
Note that each row is independent of all of the other rows. Using this value, we can
establish some information about the form of the superposition, namely the properties in
table 3.1.
CTRL3(i) value 1st superposition term 2nd superposition term 3rd superposition term




















Table 3.1: Superposition form for each control value
Here we have learned about the k + 1 and k + 2 positions. These qubits decide which
case we consider.
Table 3.2 gives us a few examples of ciphertext superpositions with an error value of 1.
We can see that upon measuring the k+ 1th (in this case 2nd) qubit we are left with either
a value in the final column or a superposition of the states in the first 2 columns. If we
know that we just have a value in the final column then we have an appropriate error and
all is left is to create the superposition of errors again.
We will consider here what the process is, for each case, to correct the error given that
measuring the k+1 qubit leaves us with values from the first two columns. The first thing
to note is that in every superposition, all the qubits before the 2 of interest will be the
same amongst all 3 terms so there is no need to correct anything there.
Case 1 - 00,10,01
The simplest case to deal with. We perform the following operation
X|0〉H( |0〉+ |1〉√
2
) = |10〉. (3.44)
All following qubits in the terms are always equal in this case.
Case 2 - 10,01,11
The process here is similar to case 1 however for the Hadamard gate to collapse the terms
into 1 instead of 0, a negation is needed first. The process is the following
X|1〉HZ( |0〉+ |1〉√
2
) = |01〉. (3.45)
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Once again all following qubits in the representation are equal.
Case 3 and 4 - 01,11,00 and 11,00,10
These 2 cases are more tricky to deal with. The issue here is the presence of the 00 at
the end and in the middle of the lists. This suggests that in this list, the next multiple
of 2k has been reached, completely changing the binary structure of the following values,
not just the k + 1 and k + 2 Positions. For example, suppose σ = 1, we may have a










Here the qubits in the k + 3 position aren’t all the same as would they would be in case
1 and 2. Correction here, therefore, becomes an issue, as working out how many of the
qubits have changed would most likely end up in performing measurements that would
destroy the structure.
An initial solution is to run the addition of the ciphertexts again. Upon the next run of
the addition, we can have 1 of 3 outcomes, when we measure the state completely. Firstly,
with a 50% probability, we will observe Bm1 − σ (Assuming WLOG that is our middle
value). If this is the case, we can just accept that value and ignore the previously obtained
value. Should we measure a different value despite being in the same superposition as the
last run, we can simply take the average of these 2 values giving us Bm1 − σ. The final
possibility is we observe the same value in the superposition again, thus learning nothing
new and we repeat the process once again. A flowchart of this process is given in figure
3.5.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose it was possible to clone qubits. Asymptotically, the addition algo-
rithm with error correction can be performed successfully.
Proof. We will first assume that we have a uniform probability of observing any value for
the error case. We have already shown that if the error case is 1 or 2, then correction is
possible. So far we have at least a 50% success rate. Suppose WLOG our ciphertext is of
the form |Bm1−3σ〉2 +
|Bm1−σ〉√
2
+ |Bm1+σ〉2 . When the error case takes the values 3 and 4,
if we observe Bm− σ when taking a measurement, then once again we’re in a successful
position. Since this outcome has a 50% chance of happening upon measurement, our
overall success probability is 75%.
The other potential outcome results in an iteration of the algorithm. As previously stated,
the only ”bad” outcome from this iteration is measuring the exact same value, which results
in us iterating once again. We assume WLOG, that in the first round of our algorithm
we observe Bm1 − 3σ. In any of our following iterations, if we observe Bm1 − σ or
Bm1 + σ then we succeed. If we consider observing Bm1 − 3σ a failure and observing
Bm1−σ or Bm1 + 3σ a success, then our outcome after t iterations can be modeled with
43













Take an average of 
the 2 values
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Figure 3.5: Iterative method to correct the error
a Binomial(t− 1, 0.75) distribution (our first round isn’t counted as we need to establish
that Bm1 − 3σ is the failure). Our overall success rate is
0.75 + 0.25 ∗ Pr(at least 1 success) = 0.75 + 0.25 ∗ (1− Pr(all failures))
= 0.75 + 0.25 ∗ (1− 0.25t−1),
(3.47)
which clearly approaches 1 as we let our number of iterations tend to infinity.
Corollary 3.1. Consider any given row of a vector ciphertext from the GGH encryption
method. In order to perform addition using the iterative method, 43 is the expected number
of iterations needed by the addition algorithm.
Proof. As the lemma has shown the asymptotic nature of the method, the expected number
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of iterations required for each addition is
1 · 3
4






















The expectation matching that of a geometric distribution has a resulting value of 43 .
Notice in the lemma the phrase ’suppose it was possible to clone qubits’. Work by
Wootters and Zurek proved that it is impossible to create an exact copy of a qubit, a
technique extremely common in classical computing.
Theorem 3.1. No cloning Theorem [Wootters & Zurek (1982)]. There is no unitary
operation
|ψ〉|0〉 7→ |ψ〉|ψ〉, (3.49)
for any state |ψ〉.
Although it isn’t possible to clone qubits, the same outcome can be achieved by initially
creating multiple copies of the same encryption. This iterative method may help to increase
the probability of success, however, multiple copies of the ciphertext in a superposition
state are cause for concern. This is providing more information for a potential attacker to
manipulate. On top of that more computation is required.
Bm1 − 3σ Bm1 + σ Bm1 − σ Error case
7 11 9 4
|1110〉 |1101〉 |1001〉
9 13 11 1
|1001〉 |1011〉 |1101〉
11 15 13 2
|1101〉 |1111〉 |1011〉
13 17 15 3
|10110〉 |10001〉 |11110〉
15 19 17 4
|11110〉 |11001〉 |10001〉
17 21 19 1
|10001〉 |10101〉 |11001〉
Table 3.2: Example list of superpositions
We have discussed in detail how the quantum encryption method and addition error
correction is performed. Below we outline the key steps of the process to go through
encryption, addition and correction before refining the method.
Encryption of 2 plaintexts
1. Input two plaintexts, m1,m2, that we wish to encrypt and perform addition on.
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2. Multiply our two vectors by our public basis, B.
3. For both vectors, create an associated vector CTRL3. The i
th row of CTRL3 is a 3
bit value equal to the bits at positions k, k + 1 and k + 2 in the original vector.







1. Perform the addition algorithm on the two updated ciphertexts. Subtract σ from
the result.
2. Measure the qubit at position k + 1 in the newly obtained value.
3. Add together the CTRL3 variables and subtract 1, modulo 8. Establish if we now
have a fixed value, if so go to step 7 if not carry on.
4. If CTRL3 has a value of 6,7,0 or 1 repeat process until 2 different ciphertexts are
observed. Take the average of these. Move to step 7.
5. If CTRL3 has a value of 4 or 5 perform a Z gate on the k + 2
th qubit.




to the value to create a new superposition.
8. Output new ciphertext.
3.3 Refining the method of addition on the ciphertexts
The addition algorithm described makes a promising start in dealing with the finite number
of operations typically allowed with a somewhat homomorphic encryption system. That
being said, this quantum variant brings new issues. This section will look to address those
problems and how they may be practically dealt with.
3.3.1 Data at rest
The CTRL3 variable is used to ensure the error can be corrected whilst performing addi-
tions. Unfortunately, that information also provides a potential attacker with key infor-
mation. This opens up the ability to perform a chosen-ciphertext attack.
Lemma 3.2. Knowledge of the CTRL3 variable encrypted with GGH allows for decryption
without knowledge of the secret key.
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Proof. When encrypted the superposition ciphertext is of the form
|Bm  (−2k)〉+ |Bm  2k〉√
2
. (3.50)
Suppose WLOG that if an attacker took a measurement they observe |Bm  2k〉. Much
like in the classical sense, we know that the superposition this value came from is either
the one above or
|Bm  2k〉+ |Bm  3 · 2k〉√
2
. (3.51)
The CTRL3 is therefore derived from either Bm or Bm  2 · 2k.
Recall that the mapping from a row of Bm to a row of CTRL3 takes the binary repre-
sentation Bm is equal to b0b1 . . . bkbk+1bk+2 . . . to the binary representation bkbk+1bk+2.
Now consider the inverse of this map. The inverse of bkbk+1bk+2 is the set
[00 . . . 0bkbk+1bk+2000 . . . , 10 . . . 0bkbk+1bk+2000 . . . , . . . , 11 . . . 1bkbk+1bk+2000 . . . ]∪
[00 . . . 0bkbk+1bk+2100 . . . , 10 . . . 0bkbk+1bk+2100 . . . , . . . , 11 . . . 1bkbk+1bk+2100 . . . ]∪
[00 . . . 0bkbk+1bk+2010 . . . , 10 . . . 0bkbk+1bk+2010 . . . , . . . , 11 . . . 1bkbk+1bk+2010 . . . ]∪
[00 . . . 0bkbk+1bk+2110 . . . , 10 . . . 0bkbk+1bk+2110 . . . , . . . , 11 . . . 1bkbk+1bk+2110 . . . ]∪
...
(3.52)
Each of these sets have 2k elements and the distance between corresponding elements of
adjacent elements of each of these sets is 2k+3. Since the difference between Bm and
Bm  2 · 2k is 2k+1, both values cannot be part of the same inverse sets. There is therefore
a one to one mapping between a measured ciphertext and the plaintext given the CTRL3
value.
Example. Let the error term σ = 1 and let n = 1. Suppose a value is encrypted using





Since the mid point value is 12, CTRL3 = 4. Suppose WLOG, measuring the superposition
has output the value 13. An attacker, therefore, knows that Bm is equal to either 12 or
14. Now the inverse of our CTRL3 value is
[−4] ∪ [4] ∪ [12] ∪ [20] ∪ . . . . (3.54)
The only possible value for Bm is 12 therefore an attacker can decrypt by multiplying
this by the inverse of the encryption matrix.
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When it comes to ensuring an attacker isn’t able to use the CTRL3 variable, it is
important to consider when the ciphertext is in different states of usage. Firstly data at
rest refers to when data is being stored and is typically needed in the future. This is where
standard encryption methods are used. Data in use, as its name suggests, is when data is
going through some kind of processing.
In classical computing, parity is used to check for unexpected changes in a binary string.
The final bit in a string isn’t used to represent data, it is selected to ensure the bits in the
string sum to an even value (or odd depending on preference).
In order to detect an attempt at manipulating the CTRL3 variable, a combination of
parity and the quantum key exchange will be used. To begin with, each of the 3 qubits
will be represented in either the standard basis or the diagonal basis. The choice for each
qubit is independent of the others. If Alice is the one encrypting the data, then she doesn’t
tell anyone the choice of basis until an authorised user wants to analyse the data.
For each qubit in the CTRL3 variable, if a potential eavesdropper chooses one of the two
bases at random, they will choose the same as Alice with probability 0.5. Even if they do
not, measuring with the wrong basis will still give them the correct value with probability
0.5. Therefore the probability of correctly identifying each qubit is 0.75. Given we are we
have a vector of length n, with each element containing 3 qubits, an attacker would have
a probability of 0.753n to correctly identify each CTRL3 variable.
A fourth qubit may be added to incorporate parity. This will help in preventing an
attackers goal that may be to disrupt the data, not necessarily decrypt. Due to the more
fragile nature of qubits, a parity qubit will also provide a check to see if changes have
occurred from the natural environment.
Example. Here the control variable is equal to 1 (001 in binary). At random we choose
to represent the 3 bits using the standard basis, then diagonal basis, then the standard




Assuming an even parity is needed, the parity bit will need to be a 1. It is therefore stored
as either |1〉 or |0〉−|1〉√
2
.
We have already established the probability of an attacker finding the correct CTRL3
vector but, now that we are interested in parity, we should check what the probability
is of permitted user observing an even parity even if changes have been made. In order
to observe the correct parity but wrong values, 2 or 4 of the measured qubits must swap
between a 0 and 1. Since we have established that the probability of an attacker observ-
ing an incorrect value is 0.25, we must consider a distribution X ∼ Binomial(4, 0.25).
Therefore, the probability of observing an incorrect value but believing it based on parity
is equal to Pr(X = 2) + Pr(X = 4) ≈ 0.2148.
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As an alternative method for detection, an entanglement of qubits with the parity
qubit could be used. Entangling the parity with any of the other qubits will result in the
parity collapsing if someone tries to measure one of the other entangled qubits. Therefore,
if at any point Alice suspects someone may have looked at the data, she can measure the
parity bit and there will be a non zero probability that she will observe a worrying value.
The data at rest situation may not arise as often in the quantum world due to the process
of decoherence [Shor (1995)]. This is the idea that over time, qubits that are being stored
will become entangled with their environment and therefore change. An attacker may not
be able to trust the value of the CTRL3 variable or corresponding ciphertext the longer
it has been stored. Unfortunately, this also prevents error correction.
3.3.2 Data in use - A realistic look
Protecting the CTRL3 variable from attackers while the data is being analysed is more
difficult. The authorised user needs to be able to read the variable. Therefore, the choice
of bases needs to be made public.
Without an obvious mathematical solution to protecting the data, the use of the technology
analysing the data should be more carefully looked at. For example in [Watson (2012)], a
cost versus security model for analysing data on a public cloud is discussed. In the paper,
it is acknowledged that while the public cloud may have the best potential, a balance
between private and public clouds is more realistic. Regardless of which type of cloud is
being used, there is a set of simple instructions that make these processes work well. In
this example, we shall use the following functions.
• Split : The data coming in to be processed is grouped into subsets. Because the data
is still in a private environment, the data need not be encrypted at this point e.g.
f(x1, x2, . . . ) = ((x1, xi+1, x2i+1 . . . ), (x2, xi+2, x2i+2), . . . ), (3.56)
for some positive integer i.
• Map: Takes a list as input and applies a function to each element. For example here
the function applied to each plaintext is the encryption function i.e.
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = (E(x1), E(x2), . . . , E(xn)). (3.57)
• Reduce: Takes a list of data and aggregates it in some way to output a single value.
In this case the encrypted values are added together and the result passed on to go
into the public cloud e.g.
f(x1, x2, x3) = x1 + x2 + x3. (3.58)
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Perform addition in any order values come in
Figure 3.6: Data analysed via both public and private clouds
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The idea is to perform the first part of any kind of analysis in a private cloud, but then
send the majority of the work off to the public cloud. This would mean that any values
that were in the vulnerable public cloud are intermediate, as opposed to the original data.
If more is done in the private cloud-first, less can be learned about the original data.
Figure 3.6 gives an example requiring pairs of ciphertexts being added together offline.
While this may not come across as the most elegant solution, there are examples of tech-
nology available to achieve such goals. The company ADLink 1, for example, provides a
product that has been specifically designed to help aggregate data collected by various
sensors, reducing bandwidth costs of data transferred. The initial operations we desire
would be handled well by such technology.
When establishing the original algorithm, there was concern about the practicality of the
error correction method we established in section 3.2. Although the commutativity of the
addition operation is helpful for efficient data analysis, restricting the order in which data
is summed would ensure that only desired error cases appear. The vertices in the graph in
figure 3.7 reference the 8 different CTRL3 variables, {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. An edge exists
between 2 vertices only if the addition of the 2 values (mod 8) in these vertices produces









Figure 3.7: Addition graph
Let the vertices of the graph be labelled (x, tx). Here x is the value of the CTRL3
variable. The second value tx is the current number of ciphertexts with the corresponding
CTRL3 value that is going to be part of our sum. If the goal is to add together all the
ciphertexts, then given any ciphertext as a starting point, the following algorithm is an
example of a reasonable set of instructions that should be followed to determine which
order to add the ciphertexts in to avoid dealing with difficult cases.
1https://www.adlinktech.com/en/index.aspx
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Algorithm 1 Addition graph ordering
1: procedure Input(G = (V,E)), where G is the addition graph for a collection cipher-
texts to be added together.
2: While
∑7
i=0 ti > 1
3: if (0, t0) 6= (0, 0) and (x, tx) 6= (x, 0) for at least one x = 2, 3, 5
4: Add all ciphertexts in (0, t0) to a ciphertext in (x, tx).
5: if t2 > 1
6: Add a ciphertext in (2, t2) to a ciphertext that belongs to an adjecent
vertex.
7: else if t3 > t5 and ∃ti, tj 6= 0 s.t. i+ j = 5 (mod 8)
8: Add together a ciphertext from (i, ti) to a ciphertext from (j, tj).
9: else if t5 > t3 and ∃ti, tj 6= 0 s.t. i+ j = 3 (mod 8)
10: Add together a ciphertext from (i, ti) to a ciphertext from (j, tj).
11: else if ∃ adjacent vertices (i, ti) and (j, tj) s.t. ti, tj 6= 0
12: Add together a ciphertext from (i, ti) to a ciphertext from (j, tj).
13: else
14: Add together any 2 remaining ciphertexts.
15: return G with only one non empty vertex containing the sum of ciphertexts.
Of course, it is impossible to say how many ciphertexts will be associated with each of
the vertices, the algorithm aims to prioritise adding certain ciphertexts first. We list the
reasons for the priorities here:
• Add a ciphertext from (0, t0) to a ciphertext (x, tx) will produce another ciphertext
in (x, tx). So in each iteration of the algorithm, we add all the ciphertexts in that
vertex to ciphertexts in vertices where x = 2, 3 or 5 as we know these are some of
our good cases.
• We observe that adding a ciphertext with CTRL3 variable equal 2 to another with
CTRL3 variable equal to 3 gives a ciphertext with CTRL3 value 5. Also adding
two ciphertexts together with CTRL3 value 5 will ouput a ciphertext with CTRL3
value equal to 2. If we look at these two additions in terms of the CTRL3 values we
have
(2, 3) 7→ 5,
(5, 5) 7→ 2.
(3.59)
After one of each addition, the number of ciphertexts with CTRL3 value equal to 3
and 5 have reduced by 1. the number of ciphertexts with CTRL3 value equal to 2
remains the same.
• The main idea in this algorithm is to alternate between the two additions foremen-
tioned where possible since these are two of our good cases. To make as many of
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these additions happen as possible, the algorithm aims to equalise the number of
ciphertexts with CTRL3 value equal to 3, with ciphertexts with CTRL3 value equal
to 5. Also, since the number of ciphertexts with CTRL3 value equal to 2 doesn’t
decrease in the additions listed above, the algorithm also aims to reduce the number
of these ciphertexts to 1.
• Finally, if none of the above options remains, we try to add two ciphertexts whose
vertex share an edge (i.e. a good addition case). Failing that we just add any
remaining ciphertexts.
3.3.3 Alternative methods
Increasing the number of operations
Up till now, it has been assumed that error correction is performed immediately after
performing one addition. Appendix A.2 gives an example of a circuit where more than one
addition is performed. To perform more additions, we simply perform a permutation on
the qubits so they are in the correct order to be input into the addition circuit. Increasing
the number of additions performed before error correction will increase the number of











The advantage of this approach is the superposition already contains the 2 terms for
the desired final superposition. The only error correction that needs performing here is
reducing the 2 outer terms to 0.
Example. Suppose we have a superposition of the form
|1010 · · · 〉+
√
3|1110 · · · 〉+
√





For ease of notation, assume the error σ = 1. The second, third and fourth digits are the
only ones that differ in each term. Now if we measure the fourth qubit, the second and
third qubits have the following form






























We now wish to define the gates that will transform this superposition of 2 terms into the
correct ciphertext of the sum. Firstly we apply a gate to make the distribution of the non
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zero probability qubits uniform.
1 0 0 0




























































0 0 1 0



















Finally, we now apply a gate on the second, third and fourth qubits to leave us only with
the correct qubits, with no unwanted extra error terms.
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0








































1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0







































3.3.4 Updating the algorithm
The whole point of the error-correcting method is that it is possible to tell which kind
of error is being dealt with. Instead of dealing with the difficult CTRL3 cases or being
selective about which ciphertexts can be added together, the best course of action may be
to alter the algorithm itself.
Step 4 in the online addition method is the step that deals with CTRL3 values of 6,7,0
and 1. The step is now replaced with the following substeps.
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(4.1) If CTRL3 = 0 or 1, add σ to the ciphertext. Now perform the hadamard gate on
the k + 2th qubit and an X gate on the k + 1th qubit. Move to step 7.
(4.2) If CTRL3 = 6 or 7, subtract σ from the ciphertext. Now perform a Z gate on the
k + 2th qubit.
(4.3) Now perform the hadamard gate on the k + 2th qubit and an X gate on the k + 1th
qubit.
(4.4) Add σ to the ciphertext.
The following is an example using the updated algorithm. Note here that to avoid a
conflict in notation, if an addition sign appears outside of brackets, that will be standard
addition. Addition used to represent superposition will always be within brackets.







2 inputs, represented in binary, the addition algorithm proceeds as follows:
































3 The sum of the CTRL3 variables minus 1 is 6 therefore the previous measurement
hasn’t collapsed down to a single value.





















)|110〉 = |101110〉. (3.70)
4.4 Re-adding the error just taken off in (4.2) produces the ciphertext with no error
component |011110〉.
7 Finally applying the error outputs the correct summed ciphertext
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3.4 A multiplication method for the quantum ciphertext
3.4.1 Potential functions
As discussed already in the previous chapter, for meaningful computation to be possible,
a multiplication method is needed. Although multiplication of qubits has been established
[Ekert et al. (2001)], a method of multiplication of ciphertexts in this vector space may
not be as natural as addition.
A somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme based on the ring learning with errors prob-
lem has been presented in [Naehrig et al. (2011)]. When the data is encrypted, a finite
number of addition and multiplication operations can be performed. After this limit has
been reached the data needs to be decrypted and encrypted again to reduce the error
growth. Despite this, the paper discusses statistical functions that can be performed on
the ciphertexts.
Firstly, the mean, m =
∑n
i=1 ci
n , is not a function that requires multiplication. Addition
of the ciphertexts, c1, . . . , cn, can be performed with the error correction method and the
total number of ciphertexts can easily be counted. The pair (
∑n
i=1 ci, n) is returned to the
offline device to perform the final division step.
The standard deviation is defined as s =
√∑n
i=1(ci−m)2
n . Its calculation begins with a se-
ries of additions, followed by squaring, followed again by addition. In the RLWE scheme,
the denominator and numerator are once again returned to be processed offline.
Logistic regression is the final function discussed. Here, the input for the prediction
function x =
∑n
i=1 αixi, where αi is a weighting constant. The prediction function,
f(x) = e
x
1+ex , is simple enough that this phase can be calculated offline. Therefore the
operations performed online are a series of scalar multiplications followed by a sum of the
resulting values.
Due to the component-wise property of addition in vectors, it seems reasonable to look for
a component-wise multiplication method in this vector space. If both addition and multi-
plication have this property, the vectors being operated on will be able to be processed in
parallel.
3.4.2 Component wise multiplication operation
Although component wise multiplication of the form
V1V2 = [α1, . . . , αn]  [β1, . . . , βn] = [α1β1, . . . , αnβn], (3.72)
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b1,1 b1,2 · · · b1,n





bn,1 bn,2 · · · bn,n
 . (3.73)
be the public basis used for encryption. Given plaintexts, m1 = [α1, . . . , αn] and m2 =
[β1, . . . , βn], attempting to perform this operation on ciphertexts c1 = E(m1) and c2 =
E(m2) would give
c1  c2 =

b1,1α1 + · · ·+ b1,nαn + ε
b2,1α1 + · · ·+ b2,nαn + ε
...
bn,1α1 + · · ·+ bn,nαn + ε


b1,1β1 + · · ·+ b1,nβn + ε
b2,1β1 + · · ·+ b2,nβn + ε
...







j=1 b1,ib1,jαiβj + ε
∑n
i=1 b1,iαi + ε
∑n




j=1 b2,ib2,jαiβj + ε
∑n
i=1 b2,iαi + ε
∑n





j=1 bn,ibn,jαiβj + ε
∑n
i=1 bn,iαi + ε
∑n






j=1 b1,jαjβj + ε∑n
j=1 b2,jαjβj + ε
...∑n
j=1 bn,jαjβj + ε




i=1 b·,iαi + ε
∑n





j=1 b·,jβj + ε) part of each sum
could be considered as the error term of a ciphertext. While the form of the error looks
like it would be complicated to deal with, the bigger issue is the remaining summation.
The product of α and β is multiplied by the public basis values twice.
Although it can’t be used for decryption, the inverse of the public matrix can be used
to make an operation that behaves more like the homomorphism required. The inverse





1,2 · · · b′1,n
b′2,1 b
′







n,2 · · · b′n,n
 . (3.75)
(Note b′i,j is not the inverse of bi,j).
If the inverse matrix is used on each ciphertext then, after performing the component
multiplication, it will be necessary to multiply the result by the public basis matrix again.
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The operation therefore will be of the form
V1BV2 = B(d1d2), (3.76)
where di = B











































Here the error is only being multiplied by elements of B−1. The error is therefore a scalar











































Assuming the product of the 2 error terms is still of an appropriate size, the result is
a correct encryption plus a product of error and data. As already stated, the b′ terms
are fixed. Therefore, assuming the data being analysed is bounded by sufficiently small
constants, this product can still be correctly decrypted with the appropriate choice of
parameters for the protocol.
We have shown that although component wise multiplication is not homomorphic under
our encryption function, we can adapt the multiplication method used on our ciphertexts
to give us an acceptably close product.
In this chapter, it has been established that as many additions as needed can be performed.
This was all that was required for calculating the mean and now it can be used on a data
set of any size. A multiplication can be performed assuming decryption allows an increase
in error size (error now a function of the data). For the standard deviation method, the
(ci−m)2 part of the calculation can certainly be performed. The final addition part poses
a problem as the error at this point is unknown. Scalar multiplication however, can be
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dealt with. Because the αi in the regression are already established, adapting the error
method from the original ε to αiε for 1 ≤ i ≤ n will make the calculation of the input for




In this chapter, we consider cryptography schemes that use the ideal membership problem
as the foundation of their security. The membership problem has the following definition.
We will begin by defining the problem of interest in section 1, along with the algorithm by
Buchberger that makes the ideal membership an interesting problem for cryptography. We
will build on this in section 2 by looking at Gröbner bases in a non-commutative setting.
Here we will look at work by Mora to adapt Buchberger’s algorithm for non-commutative
ideals.
The remaining sections will contain original work with section 3 establishing a key ex-
change protocol and addressing some potential weaknesses. Finally, in section 4 we will
consider a Hecke algebra setting for the same protocol and examine the advantages gained
from moving into this setting.
4.1 Gröbner basis solution to the membership problem
Definition. Let R = k[x1, x2, . . . , xn] be a polynomial ring over k. Suppose the polyno-
mials f0, f1, . . . , fm ∈ R. Let I = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fm〉 ⊂ R. Is it true that f0 ∈ I?
The introduction of Gröbner bases has given us a representation of ideals that make
it a much less daunting test to check membership [April et al. (2012)]. To start with let’s
state the definition and an important theorem about Gröbner bases which cause a key
difference between the commutative and non-commutative case. We use the notation of
chapter 2, for leading monomials and leading terms, LM(f) and LT (f), of a polynomial
f .
Definition. Given f, g, h in k[x1, . . . , xn], g 6= 0. If LM(g) divides a non-zero term X of
f then the polynomial
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is called a one-step reduction of f modulo g, and we write
f
g−→ h. (4.2)
Furthermore, suppose we have a collection of polynomials F = {f1, . . . , fs}. We say f
reduces to h modulo F , which we express as
f
F−→+ h, (4.3)
if and only if there exists a sequence of indices i1, i2, . . . , it ∈ {1, . . . , s} and a sequence of




fi3−−→ · · ·
fit−1−−−→ ht−1
fit−−→ h. (4.4)
Definition. A set of non-zero polynomials G = {g1, . . . , gt} contained in an ideal I, is
called a Gröbner basis for I if and only if for all f ∈ I, f 6= 0, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , t}
such that LM(gi) divides LM(f).
We are going to show how to transform a given basis for an ideal into a Gröbner basis.





where hi ∈ k[x1, . . . , xn]. The largest of the LM(hifi) = LM(hi)LM(fi), i.e. the leading
monomial of f , is divisible by LM(fi), therefore we need to worry about instances where
this monomial cancels out in order to complete our Gröbner basis. This prompts the
following definition.








is called the S-polynomial of f and g.
Buchberger showed that these S-polynomials are key to creating a Gröbner basis with
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Buchberger (1965)). Let G = {g1, . . . , gt} be a set of non-zero polynomials




Theorem 4.2 (Adams et al. (1994)). Let I be a non-zero ideal of k[x1, . . . , xn]. The
following statements are equivalent for a set of non-zero polynomials G = {g1, . . . , gt} ⊆ I.
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1. G is a Gröbner basis for I.
2. f ∈ I if and only if f G−→+ 0.
3. f ∈ I if and only if f =
∑t
i=1 higi with LM(f) = max1≤i≤t(LM(hi)LM(gi)).
4. LT(I) = LT(G), where LT (S) = 〈LT (s)|s ∈ S〉.
Algorithm 2 Buchberger’s Algorithm
1: procedure Buchberger(F ), F = {f1, . . . , fs} ⊆ k[x1, . . . , xn] with fi 6= 0 (1 ≤ i ≤
s)
2: G := F
3: G := {{fi, fj}|fi 6= fj ∈ G}
4: while G 6= ∅ do
5: Choose any {f, g} ∈ G
6: G := G − {{f, g}}
7: S(f, g)
G−→+ h, where h is reduced WRT G
8: if h 6= 0 then
9: G := G ∪ {{u, h}| for all u ∈ G}
10: G := G ∪ {h}
11: return G = {g1, . . . , gt} a Gröbner basis for 〈f1, . . . , fs〉
Hilbert’s basis theorem tells us an important property about the termination of Buch-
berger’s algorithm [Adams et al. (1994)].
Theorem 4.3 (Hilbert (1890)). The following two properties hold in the commutative
ring k[x1, . . . , xn]:
• If I is any ideal of k[x1, . . . , xn], then there exists polynomials f1, . . . , fs ∈ k[x1, . . . , xn]
such that I = 〈f1, . . . , fs〉.
• If I1 ⊆ I2 ⊆ I3 ⊆ · · · ⊆ In ⊆ · · · is an ascending chain of ideals of k[x1, . . . , xn],
then there exists N such that IN = IN+1 = IN+2 = . . . .
Theorem 4.4 (Becker & Weispfenning (1993)). Given F = {f1, . . . , fs}, all non-zero,
Buchberger’s algorithm will produce a Gröbner basis for the ideal I = 〈f1, . . . , fs〉.
Proof. Let us assume the algorithm does not terminate. As the algorithm runs a new set
Gi will be constructed from Gi−1 creating a strictly infinite sequence
G1 ( G2 ( G3 ( . . . . (4.8)
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Each iteration a polynomial, h, a non-zero reduction with respect to Gi−1 is added to form
Gi. Because it is reduced WRT Gi−1, it must be the case that LT (h) /∈ LT (Gi−1). This
means that there is a strictly ascending chain of ideals
LT (G1) ( LT (G2) ( LT (G3) ( . . . , (4.9)
which contradicts Hilbert’s basis theorem.
Because only elements from the ideal generated by f are added at each iteration I =
〈f1, . . . , fs〉 ⊆ 〈g1, . . . , gt〉 ⊆ I, therefore G is a generating set for I.
4.2 Non-commutative Gröbner bases
In order to find Gröbner bases in non-commutative variables, we must first understand
the concept of overlaps and from that how to perform division [Evans (2006)].
Definition. Let p1 and p2 be elements of a polynomial ring with an admissible order
O. We say that p2 can be reduced by p1 if LM(p1) divides a monomial m in p2. This
means that m = ml ·LM(p1) ·mr, for some monomials ml and mr. The calculation of the
reduction is
p2 − (c · LC(p1)−1)mlp1mr, (4.10)
where c is the coefficient of m in p2.
S-polynomials, which we determine below, allow us to ensure that if we have a poly-
nomial p that is reducible by 2 other polynomials p1 and p2, we can achieve a unique
remainder when reducing p by a set of polynomials containing p1 and p2. In the com-
mutative case there is only one way to reduce one polynomial by another. When in the
non-commutative setting however there may be multiple ways for us to reduce one polyno-
mial by another and thus we need to understand what it means for polynomials to overlap
[Evans (2006)].
Definition. For a monomial m in a non-commutative polynomial ring define:
• prefix (m, i) to be the initial subword of length i of m,
• suffix (m, i) to be the terminal subword of length i of m,
• subword(m, i, j) to be the subword starting at position i and ending at position j in
m.
Definition. Two monomials m1 and m2 with degrees d1 ≥ d2 (respectively) overlap if
any of the following conditions are true
• prefix(m1, i) = suffix(m2, i) (1 ≤ i < d2),
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• subword(m1, i, i+ d2 − 1) = m2 (1 ≤ i ≤ d1 − d2 + 1),
• suffix(m1, i) = prefix(M2, i) (1 ≤ i < d2).
Definition. Assume we have polynomials p1 and p2 such that l1 ·LM(p1)·r1 = l2 ·LM(p2)·
r2, where we choose l1, l2, r1 and r2 in a way such that at least one of l1 and l2 and at
least one of r1 and r2 are equal to 1. The S-polynomial associated with this overlap is
S-pol(l1, p1, l2, p2) = c1l1p1r1 − c2l2p2r2, (4.11)
where c1 = LC(p2) and c2 = LC(p1).
With these definitions in mind, we can now state the non-commutative version of
Buchberger’s algorithm. Rem(s1, G) represents a reduction of s1 by all of the polynomials
in G.
Algorithm 3 Mora’s Algorithm [Mora (1985)]
1: procedure Mora(F ), F = {f1, . . . , fs} is a basis for an ideal J over a non-
commutative polynomial ring
2: G := F
3: A := ∅
4: For each pair of polynomials (gi, gj) in G, add an S-Polynomial to A for each of
the overlaps of the lead monomials of gi and gj
5: while A 6= ∅ do
6: Remove first entry s1 from A;
7: s′1 = Rem(s1, G)
8: if s′1 6= 0 then
9: Add s′1 to G and then add all the S-polynomials of the form S-
pol(l1, gi, l2, s
′
1) to A ∀gi ∈ G
10: return G = {g1, . . . , gt} a Gröbner basis for J (Assuming termination)
While we now have an algorithm to calculate a Gröbner basis, there is a lot of redun-
dancy in the generators. We can take it one step further to remove some of the unneeded
elements from the basis found.
Definition. Let G = {g1, . . . , gp} be a Gröbner basis for an ideal in a polynomial ring.
Then G is a reduced Gröbner basis if the following 2 conditions are true.
• LC(gi) = 1 for all gi ∈ G.
• None of the terms in the polynomials gi ∈ G are divisible by any LT(gj), j 6= i.
Once we have a Gröbner basis, we can begin to test if a given polynomial is a member
of the ideal generated by that basis. Because we are now using a Gröbner basis, this
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algorithm has a much lower complexity than if we had tried to perform membership
testing with any basis for an ideal.
Algorithm 4 Membership testing
1: procedure Input(G = {g1, g2, . . . , gt}, f), where G is a Gröbner basis and f is a
polynomial to test if it is a member of the ideal generated by G.
2: p = f .
3: Reduction = TRUE.
4: While Reduction == TRUE
5: if ∃gi ∈ G s.t. LM(p) = l · LM(gi) · r for some non zero monomials l, r and
1 ≤ i ≤ t.
6: p = p− l · gi · r.
7: else
8: Reduction = FALSE.
9: if p = 0
10: return TRUE.
11: else
12: return FALSE, p.
The algorithm below takes as input the Gröbner basis calculated in Mora’s algorithm
and outputs the unique reduced Gröbner basis.
Algorithm 5 Noncommutative unique reduced Gröbner basis
1: procedure Reduce(G), G = {g1, . . . , gm} is a basis for an ideal j over a noncommu-
tative ring
2: G′ := ∅
3: for each gi ∈ G do
4: Multiply gi by LC(gi)
−1;
5: if (LM(gi) = lLM(gj)r for some monomials l, r and some gj ∈ G (gj 6= gi))
then
6: G = G\{gi};
7: end if
8: end for
9: for each gi ∈ G do
10: g′i = Rem(gi, (G\{gi}) ∪G′;
11: G = G\{gi};G′ = G′ ∪ {g′i};
12: end for
13: return G′ = {g′1, . . . , g′p} a unique reduced Gröbner basis for J
Because non-commutative polynomials do not satisfy a theorem similar to Hilbert’s
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basis theorem, we can not guarantee that Mora’s algorithm will terminate. Indeed we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5 (Rai (2004)). Let K be a finite field and K〈x, y, z〉 the noncommutative
free algebra over K. Let g1 = xzy + yz ∈ K〈x, y, z〉, g2 = yzx + zy ∈ K〈x, y, z〉. Then,
I = 〈g1, g2〉 does not have a finite Gröbner basis under any admissible order.
Polly Cracker is a name used to encompass a variety of cryptosystems that make use
of Gröbner bases [Ackermann & Kreuzer (2006)]. The non-commutative Polly Cracker
cryptosystem takes advantage of the existence of ideals that do not have a finitely generated
Gröbner basis. In the next section, we present our version in the form of a key exchange
protocol.
4.3 A key exchange protocol based on the ideal membership
problem
In this section, we will attempt to adapt the non-commutative encryption process [Rai
(2004)] into a key exchange. From there we will use the key generated from such an
exchange to introduce a simple encryption function that has homomorphic properties.
The remainder of the section we will discuss a potential attack and discuss how we can
set up the scheme in such a way that is resistant to this kind of attack.
4.3.1 Agreeing in secret on a key from a public list of polynomials
Make public an ideal I ⊂ K〈x1, . . . , xn〉, for which Mora’s algorithm will not terminate.
Alice makes her choice of private Gröbner basis
GA = {gA,1, gA,2, . . . , gA,nA} (4.12)
for a super ideal IA of the public key I.





ligA,iri ∈ IA, (4.13)
where li, ri ∈ K〈x1, . . . , xn〉. She also generates a collection of m elements that aren’t in
the public ideal, but instead are each in pairwise distinct cosets of IA. We do not need to
choose a polynomial from every coset and in fact, a suggested number of polynomials is the
average number of terms that each of those polynomials contains (e.g. if the polynomials
chosen each have 5 terms, then 5 cosets should be used). This choice isn’t extremely
important in this section but in the next section we will look at adapting the scheme and
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Figure 4.1: Alice selects polynomials from her ideal and its cosets









ligA,iri + εm /∈ IA,
(4.14)
where εi − εj /∈ IA, ∀i 6= j.
Figure 4.1 gives an idea of how Alice generates her polynomials. Although the public ideal
(and by extension Alice’s private ideal) are infinite in size, the figure gives an impression
of how the polynomial ring has been split up and how Alice chooses one polynomial per
coset.
SA,0, SA,1, . . . , SA,m are sent over a public channel to Bob in a random order known to
Alice. A potential eavesdropper has access only to the public ideal and it should therefore
be difficult for them to work out which SA,i is a member of Alice’s ideal.
Bob now chooses an arbitrary element of the public ideal, denoted SB. He chooses at
random one of Alice’s messages, SA,j that he wants to be the shared key. He calculates
the difference between his own element and his choice from Alice. This gives him
Bdiff = SB − SA,j . (4.15)
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Figure 4.2: Bob adds a polynomial to each of Alice’s so one lies in the public ideal
Bob adds Bdiff to each of Alice’s messages giving the list
SB,0 = SA,0 +Bdiff
SB,1 = SA,1 +Bdiff
...
SB,j = SA,j +Bdiff ∈ I
...
SB,m = SA,m +Bdiff
(4.16)
Alice receives all these updated versions of her messages from Bob in the same order she
sent them. Bobs goal is to use an element of the public ideal as the secret key. In Figure
4.2 j = 2 so SB2 ∈ I but SBk /∈ I, when k 6= 2.
Once again any eavesdropper only has the public ideal to work with, so they cannot
tell which element Bob chose to be in the ideal. Alice then reduces the element that
corresponded to her choice of SA,0. If this is 0 then Bob has chosen that element, if there
was another polynomial with that property, say SBk , then
SBk ∈ IA ⇒ SAk +Bdiff ∈ IA
SAj − SAk ∈ IA
εj − εk ∈ IA.
(4.17)
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Figure 4.3: Alice knows the difference between her polynomials so can get back SA,0
This is a contradiction.
If when Alice reduces Bob’s polynomial and does not get a 0, then she can easily work out
which polynomial Bob wanted by checking which εj she has remaining using
SB,0 = SA,0 +Bdiff
= SA,0 + (SB − SA,0 − εj)
= SB − εj ,
(4.18)
where SB reduces to zero as the public ideal is contained in Alice’s ideal. Figure 4.3
illustrates why it was so important that Bob added the same polynomial to each polynomial
that he received from Alice. Even though Alice doesn’t know which polynomial she receives
from Bob is his public key choice, she can locate SB,0 as the order is maintained. She then
computes SB,0 − SA,0 = (SA,0 − SB) + εj and can find εj since SA,0 − SB ∈ I.
Alice and Bob use SBj as the secret key.
4.3.2 Encryption process
Building on the ideas presented in [Ko et al. (2000)] for an encryption scheme based on
conjugacy, we will present a cryptosystem that uses our generated private keys. To develop
a homomorphic encryption system we will need a pair (p, q) of private keys with particular
properties, and we shall find these in a Hecke algebra setting, as will be described in Section
4.4. In this section, we shall describe the encryption process that uses that pair of keys.
We will denote the private key p and a second private key q. The key q is not the inverse
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of p in the ring R, but in the factor ring R/J where
J = R〈pq − 1, qp− 1〉R, (4.19)
we have pq = qp = 1.
Encryption method:
Enc(m) = pmq + qmp. (4.20)
While the encryption method needs to be simple to make it possible for weak devices to
compute, the computational operations performed on the encrypted data and the decryp-
tion are performed on more powerful devices. The time consuming parts of the method,
therefore, are concentrated on the latter.
Homomorphisms:
Enc(m1) + Enc(m2) = pm1q + qm1p+ pm2q + qm2p
= p(m1 +m2)q + q(m1 +m2)p
= Enc(m1 +m2)
(4.21)
Enc(m1) · Enc(m2) = (pm1q + qm1p) · (pm2q + qm2p)
= pm1qpm2q + pm1q
2m2p+ qm1p
2m2q + qm1pqm2p
= pm1m2q + qm1m2p+ pm1q
2m2p+ qm1p
2m2q
= Enc(m1 ·m2) + pm1q2m2p+ qm1p2m2q
(4.22)
We assume that we are in some way able to kill off the extra terms that come as a result
of the multiplication. We wish to use the fact that there is a square of one of our private
keys in each of these terms. A quotient space that incorporates this property could be
used.
Decryption method:
Dec(c) = q · Enc(m) · p = qpmqp+ q2mp2 = m+ q2mp2. (4.23)
In our quotient space the second term will be killed off, leaving us with just our original
message.
Example. Key exchange
Alice and Bob agree to use the ideal I from Theorem 4.5 as their public information where
I = 〈xzy + yz, yzx+ zy〉. Alice creates her private ideal that has a finite Gröbner basis
IA = 〈xzy + yz, yzx+ zy, xz + x, z4y − z3y〉. (4.24)
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She also chooses her first polynomial
SA,0 = y(xzy + yz)x+ z(yzx+ zy)y + (xz + x)z + y(z
4y − z3y)y
= yxzyx+ y2zx+ zyzxy + z2y2 + xz2 + xz + yz4y2 − yz3y2,
(4.25)
followed by selecting coset elements ε1 = y
3 + yzy − xz2 + xz and ε2 = z5 − z2yz. She
sends to Bob the polynomials SA,1 = SA,0 + ε1, SA,0 and SA,2 = SA,0 + ε2 over a public
channel, recording the order of the polynomials in which she sends.
Bob now chooses an element of the public ideal
SB = xy(xzy + yz)x+ z(yzx+ zx)yz
= xyxzyx+ xy2zx+ zyxyz + z2xyz.
(4.26)
He then chooses at random one of Alice’s polynomials, say SA,1. The difference between
the two polynomials is
Bdiff =xyxzyx+ xy
2zx+ zyxyz + z2xyz − yxzyx−
y2zx− zyzxy − z2y2 − y3 − yzy − yz4y2 + yz3y2.
(4.27)
He then sends back the list SB1 , SB0 , SB2 , where SB1 = SB,
SB,0 =yxzyx+ y
2zx+ zyzxy + z2y2 + xz2 + xz + yz4y2 − yz3y2
+ xyxzyx+ xy2zx+ zyxyz + z2xyz − yxzyx− y2zx− zyzxy − z2y2




2zx+ zyzxy + z2y2 + xz2 + xz + yz4y2 − yz3y2
+ z5 − z2yz + xyxzyx+ xy2zx+ zyxyz + z2xyz − yxzyx− y2zx− zyzxy
− z2y2 − y3 − yzy − yz4y2 + yz3y2.
(4.29)
Having received the 3 polynomials, Alice now looks at SB,0.
SB,0 =[y(xzy + yz)x+ z(yzx+ zy)y + (xz + x)z + y(z
4y − z3y)y + xy(xzy + yz)x
+ z(yzx+ zx)yz − y(xzy + yz)x− z(yzx+ zy)y − y(z4y − z3y)y]− y3 − yzy.
(4.30)
Alice can reduce everything within the square brackets to zero using her generators in
the membership testing algorithm leaving just −y3− yzy. This tells Alice that Bob chose
to use the polynomial associated with ε1 and she can subsequently determine the shared
private key SB.
Encryption, operations and decryption
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The details of encryption, decryption and the operations can be found in the appendix
A1.
4.3.3 Choosing an appropriate quotient space
We already discussed that an appropriate choice of quotient space is needed to the make
the calculations work. However, we have full control over what that quotient space is.
Alice and Bob repeat the key exchange process again to generate the second private key
q, independent of the first exchange and form the quotient R/J as in (4.19).
When looking at both the decryption function and the homomorphic property of our
system, there is a strong reliance on the choice of quotient space R/J to make sure the
calculations are performed correctly. The issue with this procedure is that we have made
public, the product of our 2 secret keys in R. Unlike in the integers, factoring 2 polynomials
is not a difficult problem. This means any eavesdropper that can observe the operations
being performed can find both keys.
The solution to this problem is to put off correcting the extra multiplication error in the
decryption. Since decryption is performed offline, we don’t need to be concerned with
our choice of quotient space revealing important information. The problem with this
approach is that since our ciphertexts won’t be corrected while being processed, their size
will increase at a faster rate. This means that computation and storage requirements will
increase quickly. Our choice of second key is independent of our first key. Therefore, we
can publicly quotient out by a function of the second key without revealing any information
about the first key. Although this still won’t give us a perfect homomorphism, but it will
reduce the rate at which the product of ciphertexts will grow.
4.3.4 Potential attack
Although Eve does not have access to the private ideal that Alice has generated, she could
create her own ideal with a finite Gröbner basis that contains the public ideal. This would
allow her to successfully perform the membership test on Bob’s choice of a secret key.
While this is a concern, Eve’s choice of ideal may also accept polynomials other than that
corresponding to Bob’s choice; making it unclear which is the actual choice.
We will denote the set of polynomials that Bob sends back to Alice that fall into Eve’s
ideal as the set {SBj1 , SBj2 , . . . , SBjm}.
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SBj1 , . . . , SBjm
SB0, . . . , SBn \ {SBj1 , . . . , SBjm}
Our goal to prevent an attack like this is to maximise the value of m.
To get an idea of the ideal that Eve may make, intersections of ideals should be understood.
To begin with, elimination ideals need to be understood followed by the introduction of a
new type of ordering.
Elimination theory studies the methods of eliminating variables from systems of polyno-
mial equations. The process of finding the intersection of ideals involves introducing new
variables in a specific way then eliminating all elements of the new ideal which include
that variable [Cox et al. (1992)].
Definition. Given I = 〈f1, . . . , fs〉 ⊆ K[x1, . . . , xn], the l-th elimination ideal Il is the
ideal of K[xl+1, . . . , xn] defined by
Il = I ∩K[xl+1, . . . , xn]. (4.31)
All of the orderings seen so far to assign are constructed by first assigning an order
on the individual variables, say here x1 < x2 < · · · < xn. However, for the following
definition, it is necessary to use 2 separate orderings, denoted < and <<.
Definition. Let OCC(M,V ) be a function that takes a monomial M ∈ 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 and
V, a subset of {x1, . . . , xn} and outputs the number of times the variables in V occur in
M . For example OCC(M = x1x2x4x1 ∈ 〈x1, . . . , x4〉, V = {x1, x2}) = 3.
Suppose a = [α1, . . . , αn],b = [β1, . . . , βn] ∈ Zn+. We will say a < b if the first non zero
element working from the right of the vector b− a is positive.
Specify a subset {a1, a2, . . . , al} ⊆ {1, . . . , n−1}. If M and N are monomials in x1, . . . , xn
then M < N with respect to the multigraded lex order if one of the following two conditions
hold:
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• [OCC(M,V1), . . . , OCC(M,Vl)] < [OCC(N,V1), . . . , OCC(N,Vl)],
• [OCC(M,V1), . . . , OCC(M,Vl)] = [OCC(N,V1), . . . , OCC(N,Vl)] and M < N with
respect to the deglex order x1 < · · · < xn,
where
Vj = {xj |aj−1 < j ≤ aj} for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, we also set a0 = 0 and al+1 = n.
We denote the relation between the variables with the following sequence
x1R1x2R2 · · ·Rn−1xn (4.32)
where Ri is << if i is one of the aj ’s and < otherwise.
Example. Consider the multigraded lex order on the variables x1, x2, x3 denoted x1 <<
x2 < x3. The order on monomials in these variables up to degree 2 is
1 < x1 < x1x1 < x2 < x3 < x1x2 < x1x3 < x2x1 < x3x1 < x2x3 < x3x2 < x3x3. (4.33)
Definition. Let j and n be natural numbers where 1 ≤ j ≤ n. A monomial order is of
jth elimination type if any monic monomial involving any of x1, x2, . . . xj is greater than
any monomial in K[xj+1, . . . , xn].
Theorem 4.6 (Drakos (1996)). Let > be a monomial order on the monic monomials of
K[x1, . . . , xn], let I ⊂ K[x1 . . . , xn] and G a Gröbner basis of I with respect to >. If
1 ≤ j ≤ n and > is of j-th elimination type, then G ∩K[xj+1, . . . , xn] is a Gröbner basis
for I ∩K[xj+1 . . . , xn].
The theory up until now for commutative rings has been the same as the theory for
noncommutative rings, the following theorem about intersections of ideals is the where
the process begins to diverge [Buchberger & Winkler (1998)].
Theorem 4.7 (Cox et al. (1992)). For 2 ideals I = (f1, . . . , fk), J = (g1, . . . , gl) ∈
K〈x1, . . . , xn〉 then I ∩ J = H ∩K〈x1, . . . , xn〉 where
H = (tfi, (1− t)gj , txm − xmt|1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ l, 1 ≤ m ≤ n) ∈ K〈x1, . . . , xn, t〉. (4.34)




j=1 qjLgjqjR for some polynomials
piL , piR , qjL , qjR ∈ K〈x1, . . . , xn〉. In K〈x1, . . . , xn, t〉 the polynomial can be expressed as










where rmL , rmR ∈ K〈x1, . . . , xn, t〉. The final sum on the RHS is introduced as a conse-
quence of moving t (and 1− t) to the generators fi (gj). It must be the case therefore that
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F ∈ H ∩K〈x1, . . . , xn〉.
To see why that last term is important consider the two ideals I = {x2, xy2} and J =
{xyx}. Let F = x2(yxy + yx) + (0)xy2 = x2yxy + x2yx = (x)xyx(y + 1). Introducing
the t variable produces the 2 polynomials tFI = t · x2(yxy + yx) = tx2yxy + tx2yx and
(1− t)Fj = (x)(1− t)xyx(y+ 1) = x2yxy+ x2yx− xtxyxy− xtxyx, from which it is clear
to see that the terms with a t variable within do not cancel, thus the need for the extra
sum.










rmL(txm − xmt)rmR , (4.36)
where piL , piR , qjL , qjR , rmL , rmR ∈ K〈x1, . . . , xn, t〉. Since F ∈ K〈x1, . . . , xn〉 also, F is





∈ I when substituting 1 for t and F ∈ J if t = 0 which
implies F ∈ I ∩ J as required.
Corollary 4.1. Let G be a Gröbner basis for H according to the elimination order in
K〈x1, . . . , xn, t〉 with t ≥ x1, . . . , xn. Then G∩K〈x1, . . . , xn〉 is a Gröbner basis for I ∩J .
These theorems lead to the algorithm for finding the intersection of ideals. Let I =
〈f1, . . . , fr〉 and J = 〈g1, . . . , gs〉 be ideals in K〈x1, . . . , xn〉. Take the ideal
〈tI, (1− t)J, tx1 − x1t, . . . , txn − xnt〉 ⊆ K〈x1, . . . , xn〉, (4.37)
then compute a Gröbner basis with respect to an appropriate ordering where t is greater
than all the xi. The elements of the basis that do not contain t will form a basis, notably
a Gröbner basis, of I ∩ J .
Example. Let F1 = {x, xy} ⊂ K〈x, y〉 and F2 = {y, xy} ⊂ K〈x, y〉, under the multi-
graded lex ordering with t >> x > y. To find the intersection of those 2 ideals and its
Gröbner basis, Mora’s algorithm will be run on the basis elements
H = {tx, txy, (1− t)y, (1− t)xy, tx− xt, ty − yt}. (4.38)
The s-polynomials from this initial basis are: (tx)y−(txy−xy) = xy, (tx)−(tx−xt) = xt,
(txy)− (txy− xy) = xy, (ty− y)− (ty− yt) = yt− y, (txy− xy)− (tx− xt)y = xty− xy.
The first polynomial in the list, xy, does not reduce with respect to H. The only new
s-polynomial added is t(xy) − (txy − xy) = xy, which clearly does not need to be added
as it will be reduced to 0 by the original xy. The remaining polynomials in the list do not
reduce either and add no new s-polynomials to the list. Thus the Gröbner basis is
GK〈t,x,y〉 = {tx, txy, ty − y, txy − xy, tx− xt, ty − yt, xy, xt, yt− y, xty − xy}. (4.39)
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The Gröber basis for the intersection of the two original ideals in K〈x, y〉 is, therefore,
{xy, yx}. This shouldn’t be too hard to justify even without the algorithm. The reduced
Gröbner bases of the original 2 ideals were {x} and {y}. i.e. any polynomial that contained
at least one x (y) in each term would have been an element of the first (second) ideal. The
intersection, therefore, would have to be all of the polynomials that included at least one
of each variable in every term.
Our assumption for a potential attacker is that they would try and create an ideal
similar to Alice’s. The attacker may not know Alice’s ideal but they can certainly create
an ideal which contains the public ideal. Recall that we chose 3 polynomials to transfer
to Bob. We will now show that these choices come from distinct cosets of Alice’s private
ideal. In fact, they were each a member of different ideals, namely
• 〈I, xz + x, z4y − z3y〉,
• 〈I, yz + y, xz4 − yzxz〉,
• 〈I, zx+ z, xz4 − z2yx, y3x+ yzy, z3y − zyz〉,
where I is the public ideal from the example. To make it easier to find polynomials that
lie in one ideal but not the others we will find the reduced Gröbner basis. The reduced
Gröbner bases of the 3 ideals are
• 〈xy, yz, xz + x〉,
• 〈xy + y2, zy + y, y2 + zy,−yx+ zy, yz + y, xz4 − yzxz〉,
• 〈−zy3 +(zy)2, zy2x+yzy, zyx+zy, z2y2−z2yz, z5−z2yz, yz−zy, xz2y−yz2x, xzy+
yz, zx+ z, xz4 − z2yx, y3x+ yzy, z3y − zyz〉.
To begin with, we will start with generating an element from the 3rd ideal, this should
be the simplest place to start as there are fewer leading monomials in the other two ideals
to be concerned about and therefore easier to membership test. From the first ideal, we can
see that the leading monomial cannot contain the substrings xy, yz, xz. From the second
ideal, we see that the leading monomial cannot contain the substrings zy, y2, yx, xz4. The
first thing we notice is that there is no possible combination of letters containing a y
allowed. Also, due to the xz monomial, the only polynomials left that we can form out of
the generators of the 3rd ideal have a leading monomial of the form zmxn, for m,n ≥ 1.
We could spend time working out all the possible lead monomials for the polynomial in
ideal 2, however for sake of example we note that this is the only ideal that contains a
lead monomial with only y′s.
As for ideal 1, once again, any monomial containing y will also be divisible by the lead
monomial of at least one polynomial in ideal 2. This eliminates all but one of our generators
from ideal 1. Our polynomial used here, therefore, will be of the form l(xz+x)r, ensuring
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that l and r are not chosen in such a way to contain a substring of the lead monomials
from the other ideals.
Now that we understand how Alice chose her ε’s, we would like to ensure that these choices
of ideals were suitable by examining their intersection. Our starting point for creating these
ideals was to use the public ideal I, so our goal is to check that each pairwise intersection
is a larger ideal than I.
Now that we understand how Alice chose her ε’s, we would like to ensure that these choices
of ideals were suitable by examining their intersection. Our starting point for creating these
ideals was to use the public ideal I, so our goal is to check that each pairwise intersection
is a larger ideal than I.
Even for seemingly small ideals finding a Gröbner basis for the intersections takes a long
time. We don’t need to find the full basis, however, just examples of elements that aren’t
in the public ideal. In the intersection of the first 2 ideals we have the polynomial
xzy + xy = (xz + x)y = x(zy + y). (4.40)
The middle representation shows it as a sum of ideal 1s basis, whereas the right represen-
tation shows it as a sum of ideal 2s basis. It cannot be a member of our public ideal as
the second term doesn’t contain a z. Every term in the public ideal does contain a z so it
would be impossible for it to be a member.
Now within the intersection of ideal 1 and ideal 3 we have the polynomial
z4y − z3y = z(z3y − zyz) + z2(yz − zy). (4.41)
The left side of the equation is a generator of ideal 1 and the right-hand side is expressed
as a sum of generators from ideal 3. [Rai (2004)] discusses how the public ideal could not
contain polynomials whose leading term of the form zmy, therefore our polynomial could
not be a member.
As you can see, the public ideal is included (not equal) to the intersection of Alice’s ideal
and each of her decoys. This means that there is a chance that an Eavesdropper may
mistakenly believe one of Alice’s coset polynomials is a member of the public ideal.
4.3.5 Practical concerns
Questions that may need to be addressed if there was to be a practical implementation of
the key exchange protocol are:
• There is an important requirement that the polynomials sent back and forth maintain
their order. What can be done to ensure that Alice and Bob are confident that they
have received the polynomials in the intended order?
• Depending on how the ordering is recorded, even if only a subset of polynomials fails
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to be transferred, all may have to be resent.
4.4 Improving the protocol in a Hecke algebra setting
In this section, we will look to be more specific about the setting we wish to use for our
scheme. We will look at how we can use Hecke algebras in cryptosystems that use Gröbner
bases. In particular, we will see how using a Hecke algebra can greatly improve the way
in which we generate our private keys.
4.4.1 Infinite Gröbner bases with Hecke Algebra relations
The work on algorithms in various algebraic settings was studied in depth by Shirshov
[Shirshov (1999)]. Due to his contribution, in the settings he worked in, we use the name
Gröbner-Shirshov basis. Work in Hecke algebras follows this convention. Here we form
the Gröbner-Shirshov basis for Hecke algebras where we adopt the notation
Ti,j = TiTi−1 · · ·Tj for i ≥ j. (4.42)
Just as we did with our standard polynomial space, we can create a Gröbner-Shirshov
basis from a public Hecke algebra to easily solve the membership problem privately.
Proposition 4.1 (Kang et al. (2002)).




TiTj − TjTi, for i > j + 1,
T 2i − (q − 1)Ti − q, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
Ti+1,jTi+1 − TiTi+1,j , for i ≥ j.
(4.43)
If we are interested in using Hecke algebras for the protocol, then we need to know
that ideals can be formed that have an infinite Gröbner basis. In the following proposition
we introduce a new ideal that also does not have a finite Gröbner basis. We do this by
adapting the ideal from Theorem 4.5 to create a new ideal by adding relations from a
Hecke algebra as generators.
Proposition 4.2. Let K be a finite field and K〈x, y, z〉 the noncommutative free algebra
over K. The ideal I does not have a finite Gröbner basis under the DegLex order where
I = 〈xzy + yz, yzx+ zy, xz − zx, yzy − zyz, xyzx− yxyz, xyx− yxy〉. (4.44)
Proof. Firstly, consider the poylnomials g0 = xzy+yz and g1 = xz−zx. NowO(g0, g1, r2 =
y) = yz+zxy. Since we using DegLex ordering here, zxy > yz so we denote g2 = zxy+yz.
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Next we consider the polynomial O(g2, g1, r2 = xy) = xyz + zx
2y. Once again under
DegLex we have g3 = zx
2y + xyz.
We now begin to see a pattern emerge when we calculate O(g3, g1, l1 = x, r2 = x
2y) =
x2yz + zx3y, which under DegLex gives us g4 = zx
3y + x2yz.
Continuing inductively, we get the infinite sequence:
gn = O(gn−1, g1, l1 = x, r2 = x
n−1y) = zxn+1y + xnyz, for n ≥ 2. (4.45)
If I had a finite Gröbner basis then the tip of some element of the basis would have to
divide infinitely many zxn+1y. The tip of this element would therefore have to be one of
• xmy for some m ≥ 0 or
• zxm for some m ≥ 0.
Firstly, let’s assume for a fixed m, that xmy ∈ Tip(I). This means there must exist an
F = l1(xzy + yz)r1 + l2(yzx+ zy)r2 + · · ·+ l6(xyx− yxy)r6 ∈ I such that tip(F ) = xmy.
This turns out to be impossible though as none of the terms in our basis are a subword of
xmy for any m ≥ 0.
We now assume for a fixed m, that zxm ∈ Tip(I). Now the only way zxm can appear in
a term in F is if F = · · · + (xz − zx)xm−1 + . . . . However, this means the term xzxm−1
also appears. Now xzxm−1 > zxm so it needs to be subtracted off.
To have xzxm−1 appear in some other way, the polynomial x(xz− zx)xm−2 must appear.
Now the term x2zxm−2 > xzxm−1 must be subtracted off.
We continue this process inductively until we reach xm−1(xz − zx), where the term xmz
needs to be subtracted off. There is no other way to form that term with the generators
in I, therefore, zxm /∈ Tip(I).
Since neither of the monomials can appear in Tip(I) there must be infinitely many terms
in our Gröbner basis under this ordering.
We have seen how the braid relations can be added to a basis with an infinite Gröbner
basis. So far we have only added these relations to the ideal 〈xzy+ yz, yzx+ zy〉 however,
using only one ideal for all encryption would give attackers plenty of time to try break
that particular example. Theorem 4.5 has a following corollary that provides an infinite
set of ideal options.
Corollary 4.2 (Rai (2004)). Let K be a finite field, and let K〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 be the
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where ρ and σ are nontrivial permutations of {x2, x3, . . . , xn−1}. Let g1 = ACB + BC,
g2 = BCA + CB. Then I = 〈g1, g2〉 does not have a finite Gröbner basis under and
admissible order.
4.4.2 Invertible elements of Hecke algebras
Recall the description of the key exchange that we needed to choose a specific quotient
space to work in. The reason for this was so that the 2 polynomial keys exchanged
were the inverses of one another. One of the main advantages of using Hecke algebras is
that individual monomials have an inverse defined that is not dependent on the choice of
ideal. This means that there is no need to worry about the tradeoff between security and
ciphertext growth. The inverse of the generator Ts is
T−1s = q
−1Ts − 1 + q−1. (4.47)
We can check this quickly by multiplying this on the left by Ts
Ts(q
−1Ts − 1 + q−1) = q−1T 2s − Ts + q−1Ts
= q−1((q − 1)Ts + q)− Ts + q−1Ts
= q−1(qTs − Ts + q)− Ts + q−1Ts
= Ts − q−1Ts + 1− Ts + q−1Ts = 1.
(4.48)
Multiplying by Ts on the right looks very similar.







where l(w) is the length of the reduced word w.
This family is known as R-polynomials. Note that Ru,u(q) = 1. R-polynomials can be
computed inductively using the following theorem.
Theorem 4.9 (Kazhdan & Lusztig (1979)). Let s ∈ S be such that vs < v. Then
Ru,v(q) = Rus,vs(q) (4.50)
if us < u, and
Ru,v(q) = qRus,vs(q) + (q − 1)Ru,vs(q) (4.51)
otherwise.
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Example. Suppose we have a Coxeter system with presentation < s1, s2|s21 = 1, s22 =
1, (s1s2)
m1,2 = 1 >. Find the inverse of Ts1s2 .






= q−2(R1,s2s1T1 −Rs1,s2s1Ts1 −Rs2,s2s1Ts2 +Rs2s1,s2s1Ts2s1).
(4.52)
Even for a seemingly simple choice of T , some work has to go into finding the R polyno-
mials.
R1,s2s1 = qRs1,s2 + (q − 1)R1,s2 = (q − 1)(qRs2,1 + (q − 1)R1,1) = q2 − 2q + 1. (4.53)
Rs1,s2s1 = R1,s2 = qRs2,1 + (q − 1)R1,1 = q − 1. (4.54)
Rs2,s2s1 = qRs2s1,s2 + (q − 1)Rs2,s2 = (q − 1)R1,1 = q − 1. (4.55)
Rs2s1,s2s1 = 1. (4.56)
Substituting these values back into our formula we have
q−2((q2 − 2q + 1)T1 − (q − 1)(Ts1 + Ts2) + Ts2s1)
= T1 − 2q−1T1 + q−2T1 − q−1Ts1 + q−2Ts1 − q−1Ts2 + q−2Ts2 + q−2Ts2s1 .
(4.57)
We check this is the correct inverse by multiplying on the right of Ts1s2 and state that the
same property holds if multiplied on the left.
Ts1s2(T1 − 2q−1T1 + q−2T1 − q−1Ts1 + q−2Ts1 − q−1Ts2 + q−2Ts2 + q−2Ts2s1) (4.58)
Applying the relations TiTj = Tij and T
2
s2 = (q − 1)Ts2 + q, the above expands to
Ts1s2 − 2q−1Ts1s2 + q−2Ts1s2 − q−1Ts1s2s1 + q−2Ts1s2s1 − Ts1s2 + q−1Ts1s2
− Ts1 + q−1Ts1s2 − q−2Ts1s2 + q−1Ts1 + q−1Ts1s2s1 − q−2Ts1s2s1 + Ts1 − q−1Ts1 + 1
= 1.
(4.59)
We have established that individual monomials in Hecke algebras have an inverse that
can be calculated. When performing our key exchange, however, Alice and Bob are sending
polynomials. Finding an inverse for those is a greater challenge. It would be advantageous
to use just a single monomial instead of a polynomial in terms of the cost of moving and
storing this information.
The beauty of using the Hecke algebra is that the braid relations involved should help to
fortify against other attacks. Recent papers on braid group problems still suggest that it is
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an open problem to solve the conjugacy problem for braid in polynomial time [Schleimer &
Wiest (2019)]. This suggests that this type of problem may have cryptographic use. Our
ciphertext is now equal to our plaintext multiplied on the left by a monomial and on the
right by a polynomial. We can think of this multiplying on the left, however, as multiple
ciphertexts, each of which has been multiplied on the right by an individual monomial.
This, in essence, is an example of the multiple conjugacy problem. That means it should
be hard to find p or q given knowledge of a plaintext and corresponding ciphertext. Such a
property means that this revised version of the scheme is resistant to known (and chosen)
plaintext attacks, assuming this instance of the multiple conjugacy problem is still hard.
Because of the way the secret key is chosen, we can’t just send monomials back and forth
in the key exchange. We must, therefore, construct a method for Alice and Bob to decide
on a monomial based on the polynomials being sent. We achieve this with the following
method.
Monomial selection process
1. Alice sends Bob her polynomials SA,0, SA,1, . . . SA,n−1, where SA,i is the polynomial
from her private ideal. Bob sends back to Alice the polynomials SB,0, SB,1, . . . SB,n−1
where SB,j is the polynomial they agree on.
2. Because Alice and Bob maintain the order the polynomials were sent, Alice knows
the positions of both her original choice and the choice Bob made, positions i and j
respectively.
3. Alice can then calculate the difference between the locations j− i mod(n) and sends
that value to Bob (Eve doesn’t know i or j so the difference means nothing).
4. Upon receiving the value from Alice, Bob can calculate the position of Alice’s original
polynomial j − (j − i) mod(n) = i. Alice and Bob both know that position and can
use that value to select the monomial at the ith position from the secret polynomial.
The first thing to note about this method is that, if the number of polynomials sent is
not equal to the number of terms in each polynomial, there will be some redundancy in
the method. For example, if 5 polynomials are sent and some have 6 or more terms. The
6th terms and onwards couldn’t possibly be chosen because we are assuming the position
value is in Z5. We could return to the idea of performing the exchange multiple times if
we wish to generate more combinations of position values.
The only new value being made public is the value Alice sends back to Bob. This repre-
sented the difference in location between Alice’s and Bob’s choice in polynomial. Because
we believe an eavesdropper has no idea the location of either polynomial, the new value
Alice sent will not provide information about the location of either polynomial.
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4.4.3 Updating the key exchange protocol
1. Alice and Bob agree on the number of polynomials they wish to communicate and
how many times they need to perform the exchange.
2. Alice and Bob agree publicly on generators, x1, . . . , xn for an ideal. This ideal in-
cludes braid relations and has the property that Mora’s algorithm will not terminate
if used with this basis.
3. Alice selects a subset of [1, n], say [a, b] and forms a Gröbner basis of the form in
proposition 4.1, along with powers of the variables x1, . . . , xa−1, xb+1, . . . , xn.
4. Bob as usual chooses which polynomial will be the secret key.
5. Alice calculates Bobs choice.
6. Alice and Bob perform the monomial selection process.
7. Alice and Bob both calculate the inverse of the chosen monomial.
Example. Alice and Bob agree to perform one key exchange that involves four polyno-
mials. They also publicly agree to use the generators x, y and z where x > y > z. Their
public, I, will be the one from proposition 4.2.
Alice chooses the variables y and z to use for the Hecke algebra relations and constructs
her private ideal
AI = 〈I, y2 − (q − 1)y − q, z2 − (q − 1)z − q, x3 + x2〉. (4.60)
She sends the polynomials SA0 , SA1 , SA2 , SA3 to Bob, where SA1 is the polynomial from
her ideal and
SA0 = xzy + yz − y(yx2 + zx2)z = −y2x2z − yzx2z + xzy + yz
SA1 = xyzx− yxyz + x3 + x2
SA2 = yzx+ zy + (xz − z2)x = xzx+ yzx− z2x+ zy
SA3 = yzy − zyz + (zyx+ x2)z = zyxz + x2z + yzy − zyz.
(4.61)
Bob chooses the secret polynomial SB = (yzy − zyz) + (yzx+ zy)xz + x(xz − zx) =. He
finds the difference between SB and SA3
SBdiff = yzx
2z − xzx. (4.62)
83
Chapter 4. Ideal membership protocol
He therefore sends back
SB0 = −y2x2z − yzx2z + xzy + yz + yzx2z − xzx = −y2x2z − xzx+ xzy + yz
SB1 = xyzx− yxyz + x3 + x2 + yzx2z − xzx = yzx2z + xyzx− yxyz + x3 − xzx+ x2
SB2 = xzx+ yzx− z2x+ zy + yzx2z − xzx = yzx2z + yzx− z2x+ zy
SB3 = (yzy − zyz) + (yzx+ zy)xz + x(xz − zx) = yzxxz + zyxz + x2z − xzx+ yzy − zyz.
(4.63)
Alice proceeds to work out that Bob has chosen SB3 . She now knows that her polyno-
mial was at position 1 and that Bob’s polynomial is at position 3. She sends the difference
mod 4 back to Bob. Now Alice and Bob both know to use the 2nd monomial in SB3 , zyxz,
as the private key. Now they have a monomial in a Hecke algebra they can calculate the
second secret key as the inverse of zyxz.
In step 3 Alice chooses a subset of the generators so that it is more difficult for an attacker
to guess her private basis. She needs to ensure that there is no gap in her choice of genera-
tors for the relations. Using the variables xa, xa+1, . . . , xc−1, xc+1, . . . , xb, where a < c < b,
would not be an acceptable choice. This would exclude some of the relations that are part
of the Hecke algebra Gröbner basis, meaning Alice could not form the relevant Gröbner-
Shirshov basis. When choosing her polynomials to send, Alice, therefore, needs to make
sure that her polynomials all look like they would come from a similar structure.
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Understanding the complexity of
protocols
In this chapter, we will study the complexity of the problem we based our cryptosystem
on in the previous chapter. Section 1 will introduce the different measures of complexity
in order to establish why we choose in particular to use generic complexity.
Section 2 and onwards contains original material with this section providing a general
theorem about finding the generic complexity of Mora’s algorithm on different ideals.
Section 3 and 4 will take the theorem given in the previous section and apply it in more
detail to our example.
5.1 Measures of complexity
In this section, we will study different measures of complexity, started with worst case
complexity and build up to what we believe to be the best representation of complexity
for cryptographic problems, generic complexity. We will use the quicksort algorithm [Hoare
(1961)] as an example throughout to help understand the measures better.
5.1.1 Calculating bounds
When understanding how efficient an algorithm is, knowing exactly how many basic op-
erations isn’t as important as knowing some kind of bound on the number of operations
required. This bound is a function of the length of the input to some algorithm [Arora &
Barak (2009)].
Definition. Given 2 functions, f, g, from Z to Z, define
• f = O(g) if there exists a constant c such that f(n) ≤ c · g(n) for large enough n,
• f = Ω(g), if g = O(f),
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• f = Θ(g), if both f = O(g) and g = O(f),
• f = o(g) if for every ε > 0, f(n) ≤ ε · g(n) for large enough n,
• f = ω(g) if g = o(f).
Because we are dealing with algorithms that may not terminate, we adopt the following
definition.
Definition. An algorithm is referred to as partially correct if it is possible that it won’t
terminate but, if it does terminate, the output will be correct.
5.1.2 Worst case complexity
The worst case complexity of an algorithm refers to the longest running time (space)
needed for any input of size n. Knowing this bound guarantees that any possible input of
the same size will take less than or the same amount of time (space).
Later on in this chapter, a sorting algorithm will be used together with Mora’s algorithm.
Here we give a concrete example, the quicksort algorithm that would be used in this way.
The quicksort uses a recursive divide and conquers approach to sort an array.
Algorithm 6 Quicksort
1: procedure QUICKSORT(A, p, r), A is an array that needs sorting, p is the initial
index, r is the final index
2: if p < r then
3: q = PARTITION(A, p, r)
4: QUICKSORT(A, p, q − 1)
5: QUICKSORT(A, q + 1, r)
6: return A sorted in ascending order
The partition algorithm called during the quicksort algorithm has the job of splitting
the array into 2 sub-arrays. The algorithm uses the last element of the array as a pivot
and partially sorts the whole array so that all values less than the pivot value now appear
before all values greater than the pivot [Cormen et al. (2009)].
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Algorithm 7 Partition
1: procedure PARTITION(A, p, r), A is an array that needs sorting, p is the initial
index, r is the final index
2: x = A[r]
3: i = p− 1
4: for j = p to r − 1
5: if A[j] ≤ x
6: i = i + 1
7: Swap A[i] with A[j]
8: end if
9: end for
10: Swap A[i+ 1] with A[r]
11: return i+ 1
Theorem 5.1. The worst case complexity of the quicksort is O(n2).
Proof. To prove this theorem, consider the case where the array is already sorted (a similar
argument also applies if the order is completely reversed). As the algorithm works through
the loops of an array of length n, at the ith iteration the array will be split into 2 sub arrays,
one of length 0 and the other of length n− i. If T (n) is the time it takes to complete the
entire quicksort and the partition algorithm is O(n) then this gives the recurrence relation
T (n) = T (n− 1) + T (0) +O(n)
= T (n− 1) +O(n),
(5.1)
where T (0) = O(1). Summing through this recursion gives an arithmetic series which
evaluates to O(n2).
As an example, figure 5.1 shows the iterations of running the quick sort array on an
already sorted array of length 5.
5.1.3 Average case complexity
Worst case complexity is a common way to measure the complexity of a computation
problem. The problem with measuring this way is that these worst cases can be few and
far between and therefore are not representative inputs. Average case complexity considers
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Figure 5.1: Worst case scenario for quick sort
where the probability Pr is typically uniform and Bn represents the collection of all inputs
of length n. tn(I) is the time taken to complete the algorithm on input I.
Theorem 5.2. The average case complexity of the quicksort is O(n log(n)).
Proof. To prove this theorem, the algorithm is updated slightly to randomly swap an
element of the array with the final element before assigning the pivot. The difference in
complexity arises from the number of times the comparison operation is performed. Define
the set
Zi,j = {zi, zi+1, . . . , zj}. (5.3)
The first important observation is that every pair of elements in this set are compared at
most once. To understand why consider elements zk and zk′ , where i ≤ k < j. For any
pair of elements in Zi,j , one of three things will happen
• zk will be compared with zj as it is the pivot.
• If zk < zj < zk′ then zk and zk′ will be separated into different partitions and
therefore never compared.
• If zk, zk′ < zj or zk, zk′ > zj then they will both placed in the same partition and
once again we will have to evaluate which of the 3 cases listed here they are in.
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The pivot element isn’t ever included in the following recursive calls so there will be no
more opportunities to compare anything to zj .
Because each comparison occurs either once or not at all, it is natural to introduce the
variable Xi,j , the definition of which is
Xi,j =
1, if zi and zj were compared at some point throughout the quicksort,0, otherwise.

























Pr(zi is compared with zj)
(5.4)
Suppose now that there is an array {zi, . . . , zk, . . . , zj} (put into a random order) where
zk is chosen to be the pivot value. zi and zj will never be compared since zi < zk and will,
therefore, be put in the lower list, while zj > zk and will subsequently be put in the upper
list. This means that the probability that zi is compared with zj in Zi,j is the probability
that one of them is chosen as the pivot.
Pr(zi is compared with zj) = Pr(zi or zj is the first chosen pivot from Zi,j)
= 2Pr(zi is the first pivot chosen from Zi,j)
=
2
j − i+ 1
(5.5)
This follows because the 2 events are mutually exclusive with the same probability. Sub-
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= O(n lg n).
(5.6)
While the average-case complexity does a better job of considering how difficult a
problem is for any input the, potentially very limited, number of difficult instances do
influence the calculation. This is shown in the next example, where for each n there is
only a single hard instance of the problem, the other instances are linear yet our definition
of average-case tells us that the problem has exponential average-case complexity.
Example. (Taken from Wikipedia: Generic-case complexity) Let ω be a string of binary
digits. Let In = {0, 1}n be the set of all binary strings of length n and suppose one is
selected at random from a uniform distribution. Suppose we have an algorithm such that





, if the string is all 1’s
n, for all other strings in In.
(5.7)















The average case complexity makes an effort to take into account all possible inputs. As
seen in the previous subsection, the issue with taking an average is that the calculation can
be heavily influenced by a small set of values that skew very high in complexity. Generic
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complexity is used to capture the complexity of the problem when it comes to most of the
possible inputs, ignoring a small unrepresentative set of inputs [Kapovich et al. (2003)].
Definition. Let I be a countably infinite set. We also let |.| : I → Z≥0 represent a size
function. The ball of radius n is defined as Bn = {x ∈ I||x| ≤ n}.
For a subset S ⊆ I the lower asymptotic density ρ
I








We can drop the supremum requirement of the definition if the actual limit exists, in which




. We call a subset S generic if ρI(S) = 1.
We will use tU (w) to represent the time it takes for an algorithm U to run on input w.
TU (w) ∈ N if the algorithm terminates with a desired output and ∞ otherwise.
Definition. Let U be a partial deterministic (Same input will always give the same output)
algorithm that takes an input from I and outputs an element from a countable set U .
An algorithm U has generic-case time complexity less than a monotone non decreasing
function, f(n) ≥ 0, if there exists a generic subset S ⊆ I, such that for every x ∈ I we
have tU (x) ≤ f(|x|).
Example. Returning to the example given in the average case complexity discussion,
define the set X = {Strings of 1′s and 0′s with at least one 0} ⊂ In. The running time










Therefore, despite the average-case complexity of this problem is exponential, the generic
complexity is O(n).
5.2 Outline of the generic complexity proof
The remainder of the work in this chapter is the authors own. In this part, we will look
at our approach to finding the generic complexity of ideal membership testing in infinite
Gröbner bases. The following steps will cover the general idea for this type of problem.
Afterwards, we will look in more detail each step for the infinite Gröbner basis that has
been used in the previous section.
As part of the generic complexity calculation, we need to find the total number of instances
of the problem. First, the total number of degree n polynomials in the ideal needs to be
found. To do this its necessary to check each degree n polynomial to identify whether or
not it is in the ideal. We begin by looking at the general form for a polynomial in an ideal
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I =< g1, . . . , gt >, namely
l1g1r1 + · · ·+ ltgtrt, (5.11)
where li, ri ∈ R.
In order to have a degree n polynomial it must be the case that
max1≤i≤t(deg(li) + deg(gi) + deg(ri)) = n. (5.12)
We can find the number of potential l’s and r’s, however, some degree n terms will cancel,
resulting in a polynomial of a lower degree. Therefore, it is necessary to see which leading
monomials of ideal elements can be formed in more than one way from multiple generators.
Now we are interested in which of these polynomials in the ideal (if any) require a long
time to be recognised as being whether they are in the ideal or not by an adversary’s
algorithm i.e. the hard instances. In order to look into this question, we start with a new
definition.
Definition. Let I = k〈x1, . . . , xt〉 be an ideal in a finite number of non-commuting vari-
ables x1, . . . , xt. We define pi,1 and pi,2 to be polynomials with the properties
LM(pi,1) = xiWi,1 (5.13)
and
LM(pi,2) = Wi,2xi (5.14)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Here Wi,j are monomials in {x1, . . . , xt}. The set {pi,j ∈ I, 1 ≤ i ≤
t, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2} is called a complete overlapping subset of the ideal I.
All pi,j need not be unique. For example p = x1x2 + x3 under degLex ordering could
satisfy the requirements for both p1,1 and p2,2. We will now discuss the theorem that is
the key property of our infinite Gröbner bases that suggests the membership problem is
difficult.
Theorem 5.3. Let R be a polynomial ring in a finite number of non-commuting variables
under deglex ordering, and let I be a finitely generated ideal of R. Suppose after a finite
number of iterations of Mora’s algorithm on I that every polynomial tested is added to the
Gröbner basis and we can construct a complete overlapping subset. Then the number of
S-polynomials generated grows exponentially in the degree of the polynomials.
Proof. The existence of a complete overlapping subset in the ideal means that every new
polynomial tested will overlap with at least 2 polynomials.
Consider all the possible degree n polynomials. If the lead monomial of a polynomial is
of degree n, then the largest possible degree of the second terms is also n. The same
reasoning tells us that the largest possible degree of the second terms in the complete
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overlapping subset polynomials is
dpi,j = maxi,j{degree of pi,j}. (5.15)
The maximum degree of an S-polynomial formed from a degree n polynomial and the
complete overlapping subset is therefore
n+ dpi,j − 1. (5.16)
Let Pn = { Polynomials of degree at most n}. Then pn = |Pn| is the total number of
polynomials to be tested of degree n or less, then the linear increase of dpi,j − 1 in the
degree of results in
pn+dpi,j−1 ≥ 2pn. (5.17)
Continuing inductively we must have
pn+k(dpi,j−1) ≥ 2
kpn. (5.18)
We would like to know how many terms are in each polynomial in the ever-growing
basis. This will allow us to have an understanding of how many polynomials are difficult
to classify. Let P finaln = T1 + · · · + Tm be the final degree n polynomial to be added by
Mora’s algorithm. Here T1, . . . , Tm are terms in R. A lower bound for the number of hard
instances can be given by
|{P finaln +Q|Q ∈ I \ {T1, . . . , Tm}, deg(Q) ≤ n}|. (5.19)
The idea here is that any polynomial in our ideal that contains Pn will be incorrectly seen
as not a member of I for a long time.
Although a single example will be covered in more detail in section 5.3, figure 5.2 gives
an impression of the distribution of degrees in some infinite Gröbner bases. Although not
identical, they all appear to increase similarly, with what appears to be some periodicity.
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Figure 5.2: Experiments with different infinite Gröbner bases
5.3 Calculating the size of the balls in polynomial ideal
In this section, we will focus on finding the total number of polynomials of degree n in the
ideal we have been studying in the previous chapter. This will give us a way of calculating
the denominator of the fraction used to establish the generic complexity that was stated
in the definition in section 5.1.4.
5.3.1 Monomial restriction on example ideal
The process will begin by just considering members of the ideal 〈xzy+ yz, yzx+ zy〉 that
are of the form
ml1(xzy + yz)mr1 +ml2(yzx+ zy)mr2, (5.20)
where ml1,mr1,ml2,mr2 are monomials in k〈x, y, z〉.
A combinatorial argument will allow us to count how many monomials, in a finite number
of variables, can be multiplied by the basis elements to produce a polynomial of degree n.
Care needs to be taken however in checking if the leading terms cancel.
Taking into consideration degree 6 polynomials and higher, xzy and yzx can appear at
non-overlapping points of the lead monomial in the form
LM = · · ·xzy · · · yzx · · · or LM = · · · yzx · · ·xzy · · · . (5.21)
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Position of xzy Position of yzx Leading monomial
[1, 2, 3] [4, 5, 6] xzy2zx
[4, 5, 6] [1, 2, 3] yzx2xzy
[1, 2, 3] [3, 4, 5] xzyzx?
[3, 4, 5] [1, 2, 3] yzxzy?
[2, 3, 4] [4, 5, 6] ?xzyzx
[4, 5, 6] [2, 3, 4] ?yzxzy
Table 5.1: Possible ways for degree 6 leading terms to cancel
There are 2 overlapping patterns, these are of the form
· · ·xz(y)zx · · · or · · · yz(x)zy · · · , (5.22)
where the variable in brackets is the overlap. Here the degree 6 monomials act as a
motivating example in table 5.1. The question mark represents a variable that could be
any one of the set {x, y, z}. This means in degree 6, there are 14 instances of leading terms
cancelling.
To consider higher degrees it is useful to split up the investigation into the 2 sets: those
where there is an overlap of the leading monomials and those where there isn’t.
Lemma 5.1. In the ideal generated by 〈xzy + yz, yzx + zy〉 ⊂ K〈x, y, z〉, the number of
monomials of length n ≥ 6 formed from monomials in K〈x, y, z〉 multiplied by the leading
monomials of the generators that cancel is equal to
2 ∗ 3n−6(3(n− 4) + Tn−5), (5.23)
where Tn is equal to the n
th triangle number.
Proof. As mentioned above, we have 2 cases to deal with. First where the leading
monomials overlap when calculating the S-polynomial i.e. of the form l1(xzyzx)r1 or
l2(yzxzy)r2. The second case is where the 2 leading monomials appear at separate loca-
tions in the leading monomial of a sum of the generators i.e. of the form l1(xzy)m1(yzx)r1
or l2(yzx)m2(xzy)r2.
Case 1:
The length of xzyzx is 5, so length(l1) + length(r1) = n − 5. Suppose without loss of
generality we can choose the length of l1 to be any value from {0, 1, . . . , n − 5}. This
choice will decide the length of r1. We therefore have |{0, 1, . . . , n − 5}| = n − 4 ways to
distribute the number of variables to l1 and r1. Since each variable can be one of x, y or
z, there are 3n−5(n − 4) monomials of the form l1(xzyzx)r1 that meet our criteria. The
same reasoning applies to l2(yzxzy)r2 giving us a total of 2 ∗ 3n−5(n− 4) monomials.
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Case 2:
Distributing the number of variables between l1,m1 and r1 is just an application of the
combinatorial result covering stars and bars, where we have length(l1) + length(m1) +









= Tn−5 ways to distribute the variables. Once again taking into account
there are 3 possibilities for each variable and the same method applies to l2(yzx)m2(xzy)r2,
we have a total of 2 ∗ 3n−6Tn−5 possibilities.
Summing the two cases gives us the result stated in the lemma.
Now that it has been shown how many monomials will cancel in the leading terms
of the generators, we need to check how this trend will continue. To count the number
of polynomials formed in the ideal up to degree n, it is important to see if any linear
combination of generators could equal zero.
Lemma 5.2. In the ideal I =< xzy+ yz, yzx+ zy >, there do not exist non-zero polyno-
mials α, β, δ, γ ∈ K < x, y, z > such that α(xzy + yz)β + δ(yzx+ zy)γ = 0.
Proof. Firstly the general form of an element in the choice of ideal is
(α1 + α2 + · · ·+ αM )(xzy + yz)(β1 + β2 + · · ·+ βN )
+ (γ1 + γ2 + · · ·+ γP )(yzx+ zy)(δ1 + δ2 + · · ·+ δQ),
(5.24)
where all the α, β, γ, δ ∈ K < x, y, z >. Suppose all the γ’s and δ’s equal 0 i.e. an ideal
element that is a formed from a single generator. Let
maxDegree{α1, α2, . . . , αM}+maxDegree{β1, β2, . . . , βN} = n. (5.25)
Suppose without loss of generality LM((α1+· · ·+αM )(xzy+yz)(β1+· · ·+βN )) = α1xzyβ1.
Now for the whole polynomial to be equal to zero it must first be the case that the leading
monomial must cancel. There must exist therefore αi, βj , i and j not both equal to 1 such
that
α1xzyβ1 − αixzyβj = 0. (5.26)
It must be the case that xzy appears at a different location in second monomial therefore
deg{α1} 6= deg{αi} & deg{β1} 6= deg{βj},
⇒ deg{α1}+ deg{βj} > deg{α1}+ deg{β1},
or deg{αi}+ deg{β1} > deg{α1}+ deg{β1},
(5.27)
since deg{αi} + deg{βj} = n. This a contradiction to what we have claimed to be the
maximum degree earlier. Therefore, at least one of the γ’s or δ’s is not zero. If that is
true then there are 4 possible cases we need to look at. We will focus on how the lead
monomial will cancel.
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1. Our leading monomial contains the overlap xzyzx.
(α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 + · · ·+ αM )(xzy + yz)(zxβ11β21 · · ·βS1 + · · ·+ βN )
− (α11α21 · · ·αR1 xz + γ2 + · · ·+ γP )(yzx+ zy)(β11β21 · · ·βS1 + δ2 + · · ·+ δQ)
= α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 yzzxβ11β21 · · ·βS1 − α11α21 · · ·αR1 xzzyβ11β21 · · ·βS1 + . . .
(5.28)
2. Our leading monomial contains the overlap yzxzy.
(α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 yz + · · ·+ αM )(xzy + yz)(β11β21 · · ·βS1 + · · ·+ βN )
− (α11α21 · · ·αR1 + γ2 + · · ·+ γP )(yzx+ zy)(zyβ11β21 · · ·βS1 + δ2 + · · ·+ δQ)
= α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 yzyzβ11β21 · · ·βS1 − α11α21 · · ·αR1 zyzyβ11β21 · · ·βS1 + . . .
(5.29)
3. Our leading monomial is of the form · · ·xzy · · · yzx · · · .
(α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 + · · ·+ αM )(xzy + yz)(β11β21 · · · yzx · · ·βS1 + · · ·+ βN )
− (α11α21 · · ·αR1 xzyβ11β21 · · ·βi1 + γ2 + · · ·+ γP )(yzx+ zy)(βi+41 · · ·β
S
1 + δ2 + · · ·+ δQ)
= α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 yzβ11β21 · · · yzx · · ·βS1 − α11α21 · · ·αR1 xzyβ11β21 · · ·βi1zyβi+41 · · ·β
S
1 + . . .
(5.30)
4. Our leading monomial is of the form · · · yzx · · ·xzy · · · .
(α11α
2




1 · · ·α
R
1 + · · ·+ αM )(xzy + yz)(β11β21 · · ·βS1 + · · ·+ βN )
− (α11α21 · · ·α
j
1 + α2 + · · ·+ αM )(yzx+ zy)(α
j+4






1 · · ·βS1 + δ2 + · · ·+ δQ)
= α11α
2










1 · · ·βS1 + . . .
(5.31)
Similar to before, for the whole polynomial to be equal to zero, something must cancel
the leading monomial of the remaining polynomial. Note here that if we are to cancel
this time then it must be from something of the form l1yzr1 or l2zyr2, i.e. product on
the left and right of the second terms in our generators. Note that if the new leading
monomial was a product of the first terms of our generators again we would simply repeat
the previous step.
Once again we will work through the 4 cases of the original leading monomial and show that
the new leading terms can’t cancel. When we considered only products of the generator
xzy + yz, p1 = l1(xzy + yz)r1 and p2 = l2(xzy + yz)r2 we made an argument about the
position of the xzy being different for the 2 polynomials being subtracted. This caused a
contradiction as at least one of l1, r1, l2, r2 had a higher degree than what we asserted was
the largest degree. We will now construct a similar argument to show we can’t cancel the
new leading monomial that contains either yz or zy.
1. The original lead monomial was α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 (xzy)zxβ11β21 · · ·βS1 .
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We have Deg(α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 ) = R and Deg(zxβ11β21 · · ·βS1 ) = S + 2.
After that monomial has canceled we have LM = α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 xzzyβ11β21 · · ·βS1 .
The best choice is
(α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 xzz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
degree too big
(xzy + yz)(β21 · · ·βS1 ). (5.32)
The degree of the left monomial is R+ 3 > R.
2. The original lead monomial was α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 (yzx)zyβ11β21 · · ·βS1 .
We have Deg(α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 ) = R and Deg(zyβ11β21 · · ·βS1 ) = S + 2
After that monomial has canceled we have LM = α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 yzyzβ11β21 · · ·βS1 .
The best choice is
(α11α
2




1 · · ·βS1 ). (5.33)
The degree of the left monomial is R+ 1 > R.
3. The original lead monomial was α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 (xzy)β11β21 · · · yzx · · ·βS1 .
We have Deg(α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 ) = R and Deg(β11β21 · · · yzx · · ·βS1 ) = S.
After that monomial has canceled we have LM = α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 xzyβ11β21 · · ·βi1zyβ
i+4
1 · · ·βS1 .
The best choice is
(α11α
2
1 · · ·αR1 xz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
degree too big
(xzy + yz)(β21 · · ·βi1zyβi+41 · · ·β
S
1 ). (5.34)
The degree of the left monomial is R+ 2 > R.
4. The original lead monomial was α11α
2




1 · · ·αR1 xzyβ11β21 · · ·βS1 .
We have Deg(α11α
2
1 · · ·α
j
1) = j and Deg(α
j+4
1 · · ·αR1 xzyβ11β21 · · ·βS1 ) = S +R− j.
After that monomial has canceled we have LM = α11α
2




1 · · ·αR1 yzβ11β21 · · ·βS1 .
The best choice is
(α11α
2
1 · · ·α
j−1
1 )(yzx+ zy) (zxα
j+4






1 · · ·βS1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
degree too big
. (5.35)
The degree of the left monomial is S +R− j + 1 > S +R− j.
In each case there has been a contradiction in degree size therefore these terms cannot
cancel. This means that the overall polynomial could not equal zero.
With the knowledge that there is no way to cause the two generators to fully cancel,
it is now possible to establish the size of the balls of polynomials, degree n and below.
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Corollary 5.1. The total number of polynomials up to degree n in the ideal K < xzy +
yz, yzx+ zy > is double exponential in n.
Proof. Let k be the size of the coefficient K space for our polynomials in K < x, y, z >.
Up to degree n, in 3 variables, there will be
∑n
i=0 3
i different monomials. Therefore the











Every polynomial that is not a member of the ideal will be correctly identified as not a
member, regardless of how long Mora’s algorithm has run. Therefore if all hard instances
are contained within the ideal, it makes sense to compare the number of degree n poly-
nomials and smaller in the ideal. For each of the generators, we are multiplying on the
left and right by a polynomial. The formula above covers the total number of polynomials
up to a given degree but now there are 2 collections. The total degree of the left and
right-hand size must not exceed n−3 (since the degree of both generators is 3). Therefore
now, for each degree i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 3, of the left polynomial, the right polynomial can









once again the summation in brackets is a geometric progression.
Because there are 2 generators in this ideal, this calculation needs to be used twice. The
degree of one the generators linear combination has no impact on the other. Therefore, it
is just a case of squaring the formula for the total number of polynomials in the ideal up















Both the total number of polynomials inK < x, y, z > and the total number of polynomials
in K < xzy + yz, yzx+ zy > grow according to double exponential functions.
Since we know our hard instances are within our ideal, it is a good start to know this
space isn’t going to get small relative to the whole polynomial space.
5.4 How many hard instances are there in each ball?
In this section, we try to understand how many polynomials of a given degree are difficult
to classify as a member or not of the ideal from Theorem 4.5. We will attempt to make an
argument about what exactly is the proportion of these polynomials to the total number
of polynomials established in the previous section.
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5.4.1 Sorted Mora’s algorithm



































































Figure 5.3: The top plot shows a time series of degrees of polynomial added at each iteration.
The bottom right plot shows how many of each degree are added in the sorted variant of Mora’s
algorithm. The remaining plots show the distribution of polynomial degrees added after various
iterations
To try and understand which polynomials are actual hard instances of the ideal member-
ship problem, it is worth examining the order in which polynomials are added to an ideal
during Mora’s algorithm. Figure 5.3 shows various plots that give more of an insight
into the distribution of polynomials being added. The top plot shows the degree of the
polynomial added to the Gröbner basis at each iteration of Mora’s algorithm for the ideal
I =< xzy + yz, yzx + zy >. The bottom right plot was generated by altering Mora’s
algorithm to sort the polynomials waiting to be added to the basis in ascending order by
degree. The Haskell implementation used here took drastically longer to run and therefore
only the first 50 iterations are included. The final three plots all show the distribution of
polynomial degrees added to I over various iterations of Mora’s algorithm.
From the top plot it appears there is an increasing trend in the degrees of polynomials
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being added however, it is by no means monotone and would be difficult given an obser-
vation at the tth iteration, to predict the degree of the polynomial at the t+ 1st iteration.
For any given polynomial we wish to perform the membership test on, a finite Gröbner
basis will always suffice for testing. If the polynomial has degree n, then we do not need
to worry about adding all the polynomials of degree n+ 1 and higher. As for polynomials
of degree n and lower, all of the examples deal with polynomials in a finite number of
variables, therefore, there must be a finite number of them. To find a hard instance, it is
key to understand how hard it is to capture all polynomials of a given degree.
As the algorithm runs, a collection of S-polynomials are collected and are individually ex-
amined to see if they should be added to the Gröbner basis. Sorting this list by ascending
order has the potential to ensure that the smallest polynomial, currently missing from the
Gröbner basis, would almost always be added next (this is, of course, ignoring the fact that
a large polynomial that is not even in the list yet may reduce to the smallest polynomial).
The bottom right plot in figure 5.3 gives a sense that as the value of n increases, the num-
ber of degree n polynomials added during Mora’s algorithm increases rapidly. This section
shows that sorting the s-polynomials added to the basis in the algorithm is unfeasible for
large n.
Lemma 5.3. There are only 2 types of S-polynomials formed when running Mora’s algo-
rithm on the ideal 〈xzy + yz, yzx+ zy〉 ⊂ K〈x, y, z〉. The 2 forms are
1. m1,j ±m2,j,
2. m1,j ±m2,j−1,
where mi,j is a monomial of length j.
Proof. The initial ideal contains two type 2 polynomials. The s-polynomial formed from








2,j2−1, of this type is as follows





where l1,j2−o and r1,j1−o are monomials of length j
2 − o and j1 − o respectively, chosen
such that l1,j2−oLM(p1) = LM(p2)r1,j1−o and o is the length of the leading monomial
overlap.
Here we can assume without loss of generality that the overlap is of this form. Suppose
instead we multiplied p1 on the right by some r and multiplied p2 on the left by some l.
The two monomials l and r would still have the same degree as each other so the resultant
S-polynomial would have the same form. We can’t express p1 as l · p2 · r or p2 as l · p1 · r
since the two leading monomials are the same length.
The two terms remaining in the s-polynomial each have length j1 + j2 − o− 1, i.e. are of
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type 1.
Now calculating the s-polynomial formed from a type 2 polynomial p1 and a type 1 poly-










The two remaining terms in the s-polynomial have lengths j1 + j3 − o and j1 + j3 − o− 1
and are therefore of type 2.
The only other option left is the s-polynomial formed from two type 1 polynomials, p3 as




















The two remaining terms in the s-polynomial both have length j3 + j4 − o and therefore
are of type 1. Since no new types of polynomials have been formed and all possibilities
have been covered, only type 1 and type 2 polynomials may be formed during Mora’s
algorithm for this particular ideal.
Note that we have omitted the coefficients of the terms in the proof. Every term in
the polynomials generated by Mora’s algorithm for this particular input has a coefficient
of either 1 or -1. Therefore, we adopt the standard of dropping the 1.
Lemma 5.4. Suppose for now that during the reduction stage in Mora’s algorithm that
no polynomials are reduced to zero. The size of the Gröbner basis calculated for the ideal
I = 〈xzy + yz, yzx + zy〉 ⊂ K〈x, y, z〉 during a sorted run of Mora’s algorithm grows
exponentially in n, the maximum degree of basis polynomial that needs to be found.
Proof. After the first few iterations of Mora’s algorithm, the following four polynomials
are in the Gröbner basis and form a complete overlapping subset for I:
Pi,j = {xzy + yz, yzx+ zy, yzyz − zyzy, zyzyx+ yzzy}. (5.42)
This means that every time a new polynomial is added to the Gröbner basis, there is a
guarantee that there will be multiple overlaps with the polynomials already in the basis.
The reason for this being there must be an overlap with the start of the leading monomial
and one with the end of the leading monomial, meaning at least 2 new S-polynomials will
be added to the list.
We are now interested in examining the degrees off the polynomials in Pi,j . Starting with
the first two degree 3 polynomials, it follows from Lemma 5.3 that an S-polynomial formed
from one of those polynomials and a degree n polynomial with a single element overlap
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will either have degree n + 2 or n + 1. Similar logic applies for the degree 4 polynomial,
resulting in a degree n+ 3 and n+ 2 polynomial. Finally, degree 5 polynomials, result in
degree n + 4 or n + 3 polynomials. Therefore after a linear increase in n, the number of
s-polynomials has at least doubled.
All that is left is to check how frequently polynomials are reduced to zero during Mora’s
algorithm, which is what we do in the next section.
Now for the hard instances within the ideal, all the important information about the ideal
can be brought together to understand the generic complexity.
Theorem 5.4. Let In be the number of polynomials in the ideal K < xzy+yz, yzx+zy >
of degree n or less. Suppose the total number of s-polynomials at least doubles each time
we increase the degree n by a fixed amount. Let En be the set of polynomials in In such






E = ∪nEn (5.44)
is generic.
Proof. Remember about the structure of the polynomials Mora’s algorithm outputs. It
shows that they all have two terms. Denote these two terms T1 and T2. We define the sets
I+T1n = {All polynomials in In that contain T1} (5.45)
and
I−T1n = {All polynomials in In that don’t contain T1} (5.46)
where In = I
−T1
n ∪ I+T1n (with a similar argument for I−T2n and I+T2n ).
There is a clear bijective mapping between these two sets
I−T1n → I+T1n
p 7→ p+ T1.
(5.47)
Furthermore if we define
(I+T1n )
+T2 = {All polynomials in I+T1n that contain T2}
(I+T1n )
−T2 = {All polynomials in I+T1n that don’t contain T2}
(5.48)
with a similar bijective mapping as before, then we must have
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The exponential growth discussed in Mora’s algorithm as the degree increases have been
established in Lemma 5.4. From this, it must be that the size of En increases by at least
1 for each degree increase. This increases the proportion of polynomials in In that have a
difficult subset of terms.
Let Xt be the proportion in In of polynomials that include at least one of the difficult
polynomials as a subset of its terms. As the number of polynomials grows by 1 at each
time step, the proportion evolves in the following way






, 0 ≤ Xt ≤ 1. (5.50)
Under the restrictions on Xt,
1
4(1−Xt−1) is non-negative. Thus Xt → 1 as t → ∞. The
exponential time ideal membership is therefore generic.
5.5 Will we lose too many terms?
It has been shown so far that the number of polynomials added to the basis grows ex-
ponentially with the number of iterations. There is one step in Mora’s algorithm where
we perform the division algorithm on the current polynomial, with respect to the current
partial Gröbner basis. If we want to continue to assert that we have exponential growth
in polynomials, then we need to know if this step in the algorithm is drastically reducing
the number of polynomials added to the basis. The structure of the Gröbner basis is not
simple so working out how polynomials will be reduced is far from simple. Here we will
try to justify our claim.
5.5.1 Haskell experiments
Looking back at the plot from 5.3, we see the number of polynomials grow exponentially
as the degree increases. Diagrams show what happens as the number of iterations of the
Haskell program on the standard Mora’s algorithm increased. As identified in the middle
plots and bottom left plot, the distribution of degrees appears to be fairly similar in each.
This gives a reason to believe that as we increase the degree size of polynomials past the
initial sorted run, the same exponential looking growth will continue.
5.5.2 Reording polynomials
We know that we can generate an infinite Gröbner basis because we can prove there are
infinite sets that must be part of it. These inductively defined sets come in pairs. The
first polynomial P1 in the first set generates S-polynomials, one of which is Q1, the first
polynomial in the second set. One of the S-polynomials for Q1 is then P2, the second
polynomial from the first set. This back and forth between these two sets go on infinitely
as illustrated in figure 5.4. There will always be one of these polynomials in the collection
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Figure 5.4: Two inductively sets create each other
waiting to be processed. Therefore, if we prioritize these polynomials in each iteration we
know nothing will be removed by the division step. Of course, this differs greatly from
the sorted variant of the algorithm, as much higher degree polynomials will be added to
the basis before all the low degree polynomials.
5.5.3 Polynomial distributions
While the previous argument does mean that we will never actually lose a polynomial in
Mora’s algorithm, the order in which we go over the polynomials is extremely particular.
As stated when looking at the sorted Mora’s algorithm variant, sorting in each iteration
is time-consuming. At least, in that case, we were benefiting by putting a priority on low
degree polynomials. The typical (not necessarily sorted) version of Mora’s algorithm deals
with the polynomials in a ”first on, first off” way. To study this, we must class every
polynomial as one of 3 types.
• s1 : The number of polynomials that will be removed in Mora’s algorithm.
• s2 : The number of polynomials that will not be removed in Mora’s algorithm, but
not part of an inductively defined set.
• s3 : The number of polynomials that are part of an inductively defined set.
As we work through the polynomials waiting to be added to the Gröbner basis, the re-
maining collection will evolve depending on what type of polynomial is currently being
processed. We will denote by the triple (s1, s2, s3) the number of each type of polynomial
waiting to be processed. Depending on what type is chosen for the current iteration of
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the algorithm, the values in this triple will be updated in one of 3 ways. The following
denotes the evolution
si−→ as a type si polynomial is chosen, i = 1, 2, 3.
(s1, s2, s3)
s1−→ (s1 − 1, s2, s3),
(s1, s2, s3)
s2−→ (s1 + δ1, s2 − 1 + δ2, s3 + δ3),
(s1, s2, s3)
s3−→ (s1 + δ4, s2 + δ5, s3 + δ6),
(5.51)
where the δ’s are subject to
δ1 + δ2 + δ3 ≥ 2, δ4 + δ5 + δ6 ≥ 1, δi ∈ N ∪ {0}, i = 1, . . . , 6. (5.52)
The evolution of s1 is straightforward. It states that the total number of s1 polynomials
waiting to be processed decreases by one after we process the current one. When we
process an s2 polynomial, we know from Lemma 5.4 that at least 2 new polynomials will
be added to our collection, however, it is difficult to say what type they will be. Finally
when processing an s3 type polynomial, again at least 2 new polynomials will be added.
The difference here is that at least one of those polynomials will be another s3 type (which
is why there is no negative 1 in this case).
It is very difficult to say what our values for δ can be without a lot of information about
the polynomials. However, we can consider what sort of values would confirm our belief
that not too many polynomials are removed. Earlier we worked under the assumption that
no polynomials were being removed, so essentially we had s1 = δ1 = δ4 = 0. We could,
therefore, express the expected number of polynomials to be added during each iteration




(δ2 + δ3 − 1) +
s3
s2 + s3
(δ5 + δ6) ≥ 2. (5.53)
We showed that this expectation will be greater than or equal to 2, however, as long as it
is greater than 1 for each iteration we will see exponential growth. Therefore if we allow
s1, δ1, δ4 to be non zero we need them to satisfy
−s1
s1 + s2 + s3
+
s2
s1 + s2 + s3
(δ1 + δ2 + δ3 − 1) +
s3
s1 + s2 + s3
(δ4 + δ5 + δ6) > 1. (5.54)
Subbing in the previous part, assuming our expectation is as low as possible at 2, we have
−s1
s1 + s2 + s3
+ (1− s1
s1 + s2 + s3
) · 2 > 1⇒ s1





Therefore, if on average s1 makes up a third or less of the triple (s1, s2, s3) then we still
have exponential growth in polynomials.
With this result, we can provide the final version of the complexity theorem.
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Theorem 5.5. Let In be the number of polynomials in the ideal K < xzy+yz, yzx+zy >
of degree n or less. Suppose at each stage of Mora’s algorithm at most one third of the
polynomials waiting to be added have the property that they will be reduced to zero. Let En







E = ∪nEn (5.57)
is generic.
Proof. After the first few iterations of Mora’s algorithm, the following four polynomials
are in the Gröbner basis and form a complete overlapping subset for I:
Pi,j = {xzy + yz, yzx+ zy, yzyz − zyzy, zyzyx+ yzzy}. (5.58)
This means that every time a new polynomial is added to the Gröbner basis, there is a
guarantee that there will be multiple overlaps with the polynomials already in the basis.
The reason for this being there must be an overlap with the start of the leading monomial
and one with the end of the leading monomial, meaning at least 2 new S-polynomials will
be added to the list.
We are now interested in examining the degrees off the polynomials in Pi,j . Starting with
the first two degree 3 polynomials, it follows from Lemma 5.3 that an S-polynomial formed
from one of those polynomials and a degree n polynomial with a single element overlap
will either have degree n + 2 or n + 1. Similar logic applies for the degree 4 polynomial,
resulting in a degree n+ 3 and n+ 2 polynomial. Finally, degree 5 polynomials, result in
degree n+ 4 or n+ 3 polynomials. From our assumption, we know that at most a third of
these polynomials will reduce to zero when we attempt to add them to our Gröbner basis.
We have established that with that property, on average, we will be adding at least 2 new
polynomials to our candidate list each time we test a candidate. Consequently, after a
linear increase in n, the number of s-polynomials has at least doubled.
By Theorem 5.4 it must be that the exponential time for the ideal membership is therefore




This thesis aimed to expand on the various methods available within fully homomorphic
encryption. While partially homomorphic encryption methods were a good proof of con-
cept for the theory, there was very little practical use for these methods. In particular,
we wanted to keep in mind the real-world aspects of implementing such methods. For
example, both the high levels of parallelism for the vector approach and the concept of
pushing a lot of the computation to the initial setup in the polynomial approach were of
great interest.
One concern with using homomorphic encryption protocols was that they provide a weaker
privacy guarantee than randomized encryption [Curino et al. (2011)]. So, while in theory,
we may perform any operation we wish on encrypted data, it may not always be the best
approach to use these methods for any kind of data. For example, if our sole goal is to be
able to search for particular data, then any non-randomised method would suffice. In fact,
for a large proportion of sensitive data (addresses, bank details etc), there is no reason to
move away from the strongest forms of encryption already available.
The complex structure of polynomials in comparison to integers may not be as daunting
as initially expected. Servers do not last forever and when one breaks we lose access to
all the information on it. We require methods to back up our data so that we can retrieve
the information [Dimakis et al. (2010)]. Figure 6.1 gives a simple example of backing up
data from two different full servers onto only one extra server. The data on any of these
servers can be retrieved by taking a linear combination of the other two. More complex
and efficient methods may be possible if we consider how to store the schemes we’ve looked
at based on vector spaces or polynomials.
This current research in homomorphic encryption has the potential to make big differences
in the world of data analysis, however, there remain limitations to consider. One example
is the publisher-subscriber (often referred to as pub-sub) model. In this model, various
users/devices publish data to different categories. Users who are interested in any of these




Figure 6.1: One server failure safe storage example
Figure 6.2: Pubsub style of data collection
setup). The issue here lies in the fact that if someone wishes to analyse encrypted data
from a certain category, all publishers must encrypt using the same scheme and key. That
is why we have public key systems but then we must ask who is the one deciding which
method of encryption is being used? Also, if multiple subscribers want to analyse and
decrypt the results, how do we ensure they can each get the key without other malicious
users gaining access? Furthermore, the pub-sub model is something that is of interest
to the IOT industry where computing power is limited so we wish to keep the amount
of communication back and forth as low as possible. Publishing parties may also wish
to learn from the collective data sets but not enclose their data to the other publishers.
Fortunately, homomorphic encryption doesn’t have to be the direct answer to all these
problems as there are already promising results in areas such as multi-party private data
analysis [Gascón et al. (2017)].
In chapter 3, we explored the capability of quantum computers to create a need for new
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schemes and identify what positive effect quantum properties would entail. The scheme
we looked at was based on the closest vector problem. The idea is that, depending on a
choice of basis, it can be difficult to tell which lattice point a random non-lattice point is
closest to. The quantum adaption took a superposition of all these random points. Mean-
ing that we had a better understanding of the error but, if an attacker tried to observe a
ciphertext, it would collapse back down to the classic version.
The classical version was homomorphic under addition but would run the risk of incorrect
decryption if performed too many times. A combination of a quantum addition circuit,
measurements of particular qubits, and an extra control variable allowed us to perform
ciphertext additions without the hassle of re-encryption that SHE’s deal with.
The control variable that was introduced to help with error correction did present its own
potential for an attack. Protecting this variable from malicious use required us to consider
the variable in two different states. The first was when the data was at rest i.e. when we
aren’t operating on the data. We adapted the well known key exchange method and used
it as a method for detection to see if someone had tried to observe the variable. As for the
case of data in use, we used methods from classical computing. Although our goal is to
do the majority of the work in the cloud, we accepted that a small sacrifice of performing
the first few operations in a private cloud would ensure that individual data should be
protected.
The GGH scheme may not be suitable for real-world use, however, it was worth studying
as the encryption method is fairly simple, meaning the error correction concept should be
easier to grasp. The main feature that we manipulated was the fact the error involved
came from a finite distribution. Therefore, if this property can be ensured in more practi-
cal schemes, the same overall idea should theoretically work with them too. In particular,
we looked at a fairly unnatural multiplication method here, it would be better to use a
protocol where multiplication is more straightforward.
Although these lattice-based schemes certainly seem to be more protected from quantum
attacks than schemes that are vulnerable to the prolific Shor’s algorithm, recent work
in [Joseph et al. (2020)] suggests that there may quantum methods that could put the
security of these lattice-based schemes at risk.
In chapter 4, we shifted back to classical computing and looked at a homomorphic scheme
in a polynomial ring. Similarly, as was discussed in the introduction, we looked to keep the
encryption function conceptually and computationally simple, achieved by leaving most
of the work to the initial key exchange. The encryption method was homomorphic under
addition but a little more work was needed for the function to be homomorphic under mul-
tiplication. As suggested in [Vasco & Steinwandt (2015)], it is more important to think of
the decryption method as homomorphic. The multiplication of ciphertexts wasn’t exactly
of the form we wanted, this was because multiplication of ciphertexts introduced extra
terms that we didn’t want. The choice of the quotient in the decryption did ensure we
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output the polynomial we expected if we’d multiplied the plaintexts by reducing the un-
wanted terms to zero.
A concern with using polynomials as apposed to integers is that the structure is more
computationally expensive. The problem of long computation was made worse because
we could not cancel many terms until the very end. This was salvaged somewhat by being
able to quotient out terms that included a square of our second key. Further work needs
to be done to see if there is a subtler choice of quotient space that would still enable the
required terms to cancel.
Although in our key exchange Alice does not make her choice of ideal public, we were
able to identify a potential attack given that an eavesdropper could make an educated
guess. We showed an example where Alice was able to choose polynomials that are mem-
bers of ideals with two key properties. The first was that they include the public basis.
The second was that the ideal contained elements outside of the public ideal that were
not included in Alice’s secret choice. These 2 properties suggest that there is a non zero
probability that a random choice of ideal for an attack would not be able to distinguish
between the key from the list which was chosen and a decoy. Future work should look into
increasing this probability as much as possible.
Problems such as factoring integers have been around for a long time and no well-known
solution (outside of a quantum solution) is available. We can, therefore, be fairly trust-
worthy of protocols such as RSA. The ideal membership problem is a lot newer and has
yet to prove its resilience to the same extent from cryptanalysis. Despite our attempts to
cover the potential alternative attacks, it may be that the initial problem itself needs a
better understanding of which instances can be considered safe.
The theory of braid group cryptography has already been considered as a real-world secu-
rity protocol. While this consideration may seem promising, various attacks on systems
based on the multiple conjugacy search problem have been presented. One example of such
attack is a length based attack which aims to reduce the length of an element of interest by
repeatedly measuring its length after conjugating by choice words from a group of inter-
est [Myasnikov & Ushakov (2007)]. Another example of an attack suggests that schemes
based on the conjugacy search problem may be broken down to the easier decomposition
problem (i.e. instead of trying to find conjugate elements, find any elements that belong
to a given subset that we can multiply on the left and right to create an equal element)
[Shpilrain & Ushakov (2006)]. Unfortunately, further studies have suggested that methods
such as the algebraic eraser may be breakable [Blackburn & Robshaw (2016)]. Although
fundamentally there is a difference between an algebra and a group, the fact that the
Hecke algebra encryption method is based on conjugation does give rise to concern about
the security of the method.
The status of Polly Cracker and Gröbner bases for the basis of cryptographic protocols
appear to be unclear. Despite suggestions that these avenues may not be the best choice
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for cryptography due to inefficiency and weaknesses found [Barkee et al. (1994)] [AL-
Rummana & Shende (2018)], an effort is still made to try and find solutions surrounding
these problems [Rai (2004)] [Albrecht et al. (2016)].
In chapter 5, we considered the generic difficulty of finding a partial Gröbner basis that
would make ideal membership testing efficient. We claimed that this was exponentially
difficult, but the proof did include an assumption about which polynomials Mora’s algo-
rithm would add to the basis.
The overall idea of the proof was that, if we are working with a finite number of variables,
we wanted to add enough polynomials to the basis so that there would always be at least
two s-polynomials generated at each iteration. We did this by running the algorithm long
enough so that for each variable there was at least one polynomial whose lead monomial
began with that variable. The same also went for the end of the lead monomial. This was
enough to show that as the degrees increased, the number of iterations would at least dou-
ble. An assumption we made here was that not too many polynomials would be reduced
to zero.
The first justification of our assumption was from Haskell simulations. We saw that for
differing numbers of iterations, a similar-looking distribution of polynomial degrees was
output each time. We showed that for the first few degrees that there was exponential
growth and so we have reason to believe that this trend would continue. The second
justification used information that proves a basis has an infinite Gröbner basis in the first
place. We show inductively defined sets are generated during Mora’s algorithm and come
in pairs. We argued that if we prioritize finding these first then we would never get to the
polynomials that would be thrown away. The problem with this is that after reaching a
certain degree, no new polynomials added would be useful for membership testing. The
third approach looked to classify the polynomials that were generated. The classes were
based on their future effect on the number of polynomials added to the Gröbner basis. As
the algorithm iterated over these polynomials the proportions of each constantly changed.
We stated an upper bound for the proportion of the class we didn’t want to see at each
iteration if we wanted membership testing to remain difficult. Further research into this
area may consider using something like Lotka-Volterra [Freedman (1980)] to better model
the population changes.
In summary, there appear to be three important aspects of designing a fully homomorphic
cryptosystem. As expected, the fundamental aspect is that the cryptosystem is built on
what is presumed to be a difficult mathematical problem. Unfortunately, that means a
lot of these schemes are built on shaky foundations. Anyone wanting to use these schemes
will have to put a lot more faith that these problems won’t be solved due to the relatively
smaller research in finding solutions than much older problems. Thankfully however there
does appear to be multiple candidate problems.
The next aspect is finding an appropriate homomorphism that can be built around these
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problems. We’ve seen both in this work and many other publications that there are multi-
ple approaches to finding homomorphisms under both addition and multiplication. Unlike
methods such as RSA, where the homomorphism was a simple consequence of the func-
tion, we did need to put more effort into the choice of parameters and techniques for our
operations to ensure addition and multiplication worked how we wanted.
Performing simple operations becomes computationally more complex brings us to the
final aspect of what a practical system needs. All of this work to create a system where
private data can be safely analysed in a public cloud is useless if it takes an unreasonable
amount of time to get the results we are interested in. Therefore, we need to ensure that
once we have something that works, it needs to be as efficient as possible. Now, due to the
inherent more complicated structure, it seems unlikely that these systems will be as fast
as what exists for standard encryption. Hopefully, as technology inevitably gets better
this difference in speed will be compensated for.
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A.1 Polynomial scheme example
Now either Alice or Bob can look at encrypting and operating on data. We already
discussed that an appropriate choice of quotient space is needed to make the calculations
work. Lets assume Alice and Bob repeat the process once again to get a second secret
key. For the sake of brevity, well say yxy + z. Now consider the ideal
〈SB(yxy + z)− 1, (yxy + z)SB − 1〉, (A.1)
recalling that SB = xyxzyx+ xy
2zx+ zyxyz+ z2xyz. Our requirement that we have two
secret keys that satisfy the inverse property will hold if we quotient out our polynomials
in our ciphertext by this ideal i.e. anytime we see the product of our two keys appear in
a ciphertext, we can replace it with a 1.
To prevent tedious amounts of expanding brackets, we will keep a lot of the polynomials
factored and we will also make the substitutions
A = xyxzyx,B = xy2zx, C = zyxyz,D = z2xyz,W = yxy. (A.2)
This means that we have the public ideal 〈(W + z)2〉 that we can use to reduce terms
while in the cloud. We will also have the private ideal 〈(A+B+C+D)(W + z)−1, (W +




(Enc(x) + Enc(y)) ∗ Enc(z)
=((A+B + C +D)x(W + z) + (W + z)x(A+B + C +D)
+(A+B + C +D)y(W + z) + (W + z)y(A+B + C +D))
∗((A+B + C +D)z(W + z) + (W + z)z(A+B + C +D))
=((A+B + C +D)(x+ y)(W + z) + (W + z)(x+ y)(A+B + C +D))
∗((A+B + C +D)z(W + z) + (W + z)z(A+B + C +D))
=(A+B + C +D)(x+ y)(W + z)(A+B + C +D)z(W + z)
+(A+B + C +D)(x+ y)(W + z)2z(A+B + C +D)
+(W + z)(x+ y)(A+B + C +D)2z(W + z)
+(W + z)(x+ y)(A+B + C +D)(W + z)z(A+B + C +D).
(A.3)
Our public ideal space kills off multiples of (W + z)2, so that leaves us with
(A+B + C +D)(x+ y)(W + z)(A+B + C +D)z(W + z)
+(W + z)(x+ y)(A+B + C +D)2z(W + z)
+(W + z)(x+ y)(A+B + C +D)(W + z)z(A+B + C +D).
(A.4)
Performing the decryption method, we have
Dec((Enc(x) + Enc(y)) ∗ Enc(z))
=(W + z)((A+B + C +D)(x+ y)(W + z)(A+B + C +D)z(W + z)
+(W + z)(x+ y)(A+B + C +D)2z(W + z)
+(W + z)(x+ y)(A+B + C +D)(W + z)z(A+B + C +D))(A+B + C +D)
=(W + z)(A+B + C +D)(x+ y)(W + z)(A+B + C +D)z(W + z)(A+B + C +D)
+(W + z)2(x+ y)(A+B + C +D)2z(W + z)(A+B + C +D)
+(W + z)2(x+ y)(A+B + C +D)(W + z)z(A+B + C +D)2.
(A.5)
Once again reducing according to our public ideal we are left with
(W + z)(A+B+C+D)(x+ y)(W + z)(A+B+C+D)z(W + z)(A+B+C+D). (A.6)
Now that we are offline we can use the private ideal which gives us
































Figure A.1: Quantum encryption and addition of ciphertexts
A.3 Using the Haskell code
For testing purposes, code was written in haskell to find Gröbner bases from a list of
polynomials (representing the original ideal). To run the code in the terminal first move to
the directory where NonCommutative.hs is saved. To compile the code run the command
ghc NonCommutative.hs




( \ instead of / if on windows ). Upon running that command there will be a prompt
“Enter your list of polynomials“. The entire list of polynomials must be surrounded by
quotes. The polynomials are separated by commas (no spaces). Each term in a polynomial
must be expressed by a triple:
1. Sign, either + or -,
2. Coefficient,
3. Monomial, capital letters for variables.
The ordering used is degLex and would need to be changed in the code if another ordering
is desired. Letters M, T, P cannot be used as variables as they are reserved for defining
monomials, terms and polynomials respectively. Note that unlike in normal notation,
redundancy such as a coefficient of 1 or leading term having a plus in front can’t be
removed.
Example: If we wish to enter the ideal used in chapter 4, 〈xzy + yz, yzx+ zy〉, we would
type “+1XZY+1YZ,+1YZX+1ZY“ into the terminal. The number of iterations of the
algorithm is set to 100 currently but can be modified in the code on line 453.
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Buchberger, B. & Winkler, F. 1998 Gröbner bases and applications, , vol. 17.
Bulygin, S. 2005 Chosen-ciphertext attack on noncommutative polly cracker. CoRR
abs/cs/0508015.
Bump, D. 2010 Hecke Algebras pp. 1–120.
Cheon, J. H. & Jun, B. 2003 A polynomial time algorithm for the braid diffie-




Colbeck, R. & Kent, A. 2011 Private randomness expansion with untrusted devices.
Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical 44 (9), 095305.
Cormen, T. H., Leiserson, C. E., Rivest, R. L. & Stein, C. 2009 Introduction to
algorithms.
Cortés, R., Hernández, J. & Morales, E. 2007 Noncommutative gröbner basis
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